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
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BY

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD

AUTHOR OF "REASON IN REVELATION," "THE USE OF SCIENCE TO CHRISTIANS," "PROGRESSIVE REVELATION."

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PREFACE

THE present volume,—whose contents originally appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, and are reprinted by kind permission of its editor,—owes its title to the subject-matter of the first three essays it contains. They are an attempt to consider, in the light of that great principle of development which has illuminated so many mysteries of nature and of man, the relation of law to the freedom of the Will. This is the real point in dispute between determinists and indeterminists, though not infrequently the main issue has been obscured by side contests. The accusation brought against indeterminists has emphatically been that, in a universe where law is paramount, they make a supreme and unwarranted exception; and for the most part they have been but too ready

to accept the position thus assigned to them. Perhaps it has in fact really been theirs. Their point of view has readily lent itself to the supposition that human freedom must mean something *more* than unshackled development of all human powers to their highest pitch—and the "something more" has resolved itself into the capacity of deliberate falling short of this complete development in one special direction, *i.e.* the moral. According to popular parlance we are *free* to choose between good and evil.

It has always seemed to the writer that the use of the word "free" in this connection is misuse. A nature which falls below its highest capabilities is not free; and the key to the reconciliation between determinism and indeterminism would seem to lie in the frank recognition that, since in a universe which is a cosmos, lawlessness in any region cannot exist, free-will must act in accordance with, and therefore in a certain sense in subjection to, law. The question immediately arises: what law? A wholly self-

originated law would be theoretically compatible with free-will, but it is clearly impossible in the case of finite beings. A law such as that of conformity to type appears at first sight to carry with it the whole burden of necessity. To this conclusion, however, the writer demurs for reasons which she trusts even the condensed argument of these essays may make clear to her readers. As in former writings, it has been ~~her~~ aim rather to suggest than to exhaust the possibilites of her theme—in the present instance one which it requires some courage to attack, and which the fourth and fifth essays, though not ostensibly on the same subject, may serve further to elucidate by the side lights which they throw.

It is the writer's conviction, shared, as she has recently found, by one of the most widely-read and original thinkers of the day, that at no former period in the world's history has it been possible to approach the "problem" of free-will, with more hope of making some advance towards solution than now. Any serious effort to ap-

proach it in the light of modern scientific thought may therefore be productive of rich results.

Nor is this conviction incompatible with another, viz. that no advance towards the solution of this or of any other of those metaphysical problems which are so relentlessly practical is possible, save on Christian lines, giving to the term "Christian" no hard and narrow sense, but that broad sweep of interpretation which the keen insight of its most fervent apostle,—how rarely approached since,—perceived to be alone adequate when he exclaimed: "*All things* are yours, and ye are Christ's, and Christ is God's."

EMMA MARIE CAILLARD.

September 2nd, 1899.

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LAW AND FREEDOM

THE LAW OF LIBERTY

THE subject of the will—of its freedom or its bondage—is one of perennial and undying interest, and despite the best efforts of the best thinkers through ages of speculation and inquiry, it is generally supposed that we are quite as far from coming to any definite conclusion as we ever have been, and that the only sensible course to pursue with regard to a problem so abstruse and impracticable is to leave it alone. "No wise man," it has been said, "will attempt to find a solution for the eternal antinomy of Freedom and Necessity." But this "eternal antinomy" so continually confronts us, and that not only as a theoretical but a practical difficulty, that it is impossible to thrust it out of mind, and consequently fresh and fresh efforts are made, if not

to attain "a precise solution," at any rate to suggest the direction in which it seems possible that a solution may lie. The present essay is an attempt to shadow forth a line of thought which has as yet been insufficiently explored, and which appears to give promise of some fruitful results.

If we confine ourselves within the bounds of experience, there is one thing which we may regard as pre-supposed in will, and that is *life*. The only knowledge we have of will, whether the latter be conscious or unconscious, is through living creatures. It would seem, therefore, as though the science which deals with living creatures should supply us with some data for forming judgments about the will, and that it would be wise, before discussing what may possibly be the meaning of free-will, to ascertain what is certainly, so far as our knowledge goes, the meaning of free life. For this inquiry we are assuredly better equipped at the present day than has ever been the case in the past. Biology is no whit behind her sister natural sciences in the progress she has made, and it may very truly be said that the discoveries and generalisations which are the outcome of modern investigation

in this most interesting region fall little short of a veritable revelation. In all that we have learned, however, and in all that we hope to learn of the world of organic life, we have never passed, nor do we ever expect to pass, beyond the sway of law. Vital phenomena are a cosmos, not a chaos, and consequently in them, no less than in inorganic nature, we recognise the presence of "necessity." Are we, therefore, to say that freedom is excluded? This, of course, depends on what we mean by freedom. If it is exemption from law, "an indeterminate possibility of becoming and doing anything," then wherever necessity is present, freedom must perforce be absent. Yet many familiar observations might warn us that we are on a false track here. To take one only: the English nation is, without doubt, the freest in the world, and it is so because it is the most law-abiding. In *liberty*, as the sons of England have conceived and in part realised it, the opposite elements of freedom and necessity are seen combined, showing that they may, under some aspects at any rate, be regarded as complementary.

This truth is exemplified somewhat differently,

and in a manner more apposite to our present subject, in the contrast between the production of a work of art—a piece of sculpture, for instance —and the growth of a plant. In both cases a particular sequence is followed; we can trace cause and effect, the adaptation of means to ends, a gradual development, a resulting symmetry. In the case of the sculpture, all this is due to external design and workmanship, and we should describe the result as determined. In other words, we here see in the thing worked upon necessity only, and a very little reflection will convince us that this is invariably the case whenever anything is produced or modified solely by working upon it from *without*. The growth of a plant does not fall under this category. It is due to a process which is initiated and carried on from *within*, not independently of external conditions, as we shall presently see, but yet in no sense originated or coerced by them. This process is the only one suitable to the developing life, and of which, therefore, it is capable. It appears, then, as though we might here also use the word determination; but it is not the same kind of determination as that we have before

described, and perhaps the difference may be indicated by employing the term *conditioned* instead of determined. The organism has not, indeed, "an indeterminate possibility of becoming and doing anything," but it has that which the sculpture has not, a conditioned possibility of realising its own potentialities, and it is in the possession of these potentialities, and of the means of realising them, that we perceive the existence of *freedom*.

According to this conception a perfectly free life would consist, not in being unconditioned—*i.e.* in having no conditions to respond to—but in being so full, varied, and vigorous that no conditions would thwart or cramp it, but serve only as a fresh opportunity for self-realisation. If we regard not this or that special kind of organism, but organic life on our planet as a whole, we may see in it some slight approximation to this freedom of self-realisation, attained by a continual process of self-adaptation to changing external conditions. From a less general point of view we perceive the nearest approach to it in man. He can adapt himself to changes in the environment, extremes of climate, alterations of

diet, to an extent which is not possible to any other animal. This, of course, is in great part due to his power of intelligent prevision and contrivance. His mental superiority enables him, within wider limits than any other animal, not only to adapt himself to, but to modify external conditions so as to suit the exigencies of his own development; in other words, to bring these external conditions into correspondence with the internal or self-initiated conditions. Consequently he supplies a truer and higher exemplification of free or self-realising life than is to be found in the rest of the organic world, though there is no single organism which does not to some extent exhibit it, because there is no single organism which is not to some extent capable of that self-adaptation which is its note.

The mention of external conditions reminds us that in the case of organic life these are never absent. The environment plays a large and very important part in the process of development; it may be modified, but it also modifies, and the life is therefore doubly conditioned, from within by its own capabilities, from without by the environment. In the case of any finite being, it

would seem that there is no escape from this double conditioning. We could not conceive of such a being as wholly conditioned from within —*i.e.* as existing absolutely without any external conditions to which the internal must be brought to correspond. For this reason perfect freedom in a finite being would be a freedom unlimited in response to, but limited in initiation of conditions, because some of the conditions of its life must always be originated from without itself. A freedom greater than this, a freedom unlimited in initiation of conditions as well as in response to them, could belong only to an Infinite Being, because it would imply that all the conditions arise from within, and none from without the life, which is thus not lawless, but absolutely law-including, a law unto itself. This is the freedom which we ascribe to the Divine Life. The perfect law of liberty in its absolute perfection is not to be found elsewhere. Nevertheless, the reflection of the divine freedom is seen in the universe which is the outcome of the divine activity, and most especially in the organic division of that universe. We do there, as has already been said, perceive in a limited degree

the power of initiation. Without it, that capacity for self-adaptation, which all living things exhibit to a greater or less extent, could hardly be conceived to exist. It is the impulse to self-realisation which impels the organism to assimilate conditions external to itself, and include them within the range of its own life.

The ideal of freedom for finite life is, then, such correspondence between internal and external conditions that its every potentiality may be fully and perfectly realised. It is hardly necessary to point out that within our experience this ideal never becomes actual. Whatever we may think of the general action of such a principle as natural selection, however entirely we may acknowledge that it is on the whole beneficial, we cannot possibly deny that potentialities of life are destroyed as well as fostered by it. Those individuals and those species which are weeded out, have not been able to realise all of which they were capable. Less arduous conditions, a more favourable environment, would have enabled them to attain to some development which would have been the full and adequate expression of their life. As it is, such an

expression has not in them been reached. The pressure of external conditions has been such that they were not free to realise it.

We perceive such failures throughout the whole organic world, but in a much more marked degree as we rise towards the summit. This is no doubt partly because, as life increases in scope and worth, its abortive expressions, those realisations which might have been and are not, naturally awake in us a deeper feeling of regret and astonishment at Nature's apparently wasteful procedure. But this is not the only reason. The lower, especially the lowest forms of life, have so little in them, comparatively speaking, which wants to realise itself, and they make, consequently, so little demand on the environment, that the difficulty of adjusting internal to external conditions is not at all what chiefly strikes us. On the contrary, that which most impresses us in these lowest forms of life is the fact that, if they had greater powers of response, the environment would be amply sufficient to satisfy them. The restriction here is clearly seen to be from within, not from without. It is when we turn to the higher organisms, and especially

to man, the highest, that we seem to become so strongly conscious of failure in the environment. It appears too narrow for the potentialities of life. External conditions, in consequence, press hardly; they do not give scope enough, and we are left to lament the realisations which might have been. On further reflection, however, it appears as though the failure which at first sight we charge upon the environment, ought rather to be attributed to the organism. If the latter could adapt itself indefinitely, the environment would always suffice; and is it not just such indefinite adaptability that we have indicated as the true ideal of freedom for finite life? Not quite; the conclusion at which we finally arrived was: Such adaptability as would enable *every potentiality to be fully and perfectly realised.* If indefinite adaptability leads, in order to the preservation of life, to the abandonment of any possibilities which that life originally had, its self-realisation has been stunted. It has not attained its most adequate expression, and the cause of the failure does lie in the environment and not in the life. Consequently the latter has failed of its full measure of liberty. It was not free to develop.

This is one aspect of the question, but we must now turn to examine another, and if in so doing we seem at first only to bring out startling paradoxes, these must not daunt us. It is only by confronting them boldly, and giving them full weight, that we can hope to throw any light upon the meaning of that "eternal antinomy of freedom and necessity" which we are now endeavouring to investigate in its relation to the world of organic life.

The point at which we have arrived is, that owing to the pressure of external conditions, much life is not free. It never attains to its full measure of realisation. But it has already been observed that if we look on organic life as a whole, and not on any particular manifestations of it, a considerable measure and variety of realisation is attained. In fact, this general richness and diversity of life is what first strikes the observer of nature. It is only by closer investigation and more careful study that he becomes aware of the sacrifice made to attain it, of the lives which have perished or been stunted in order that the lives which survive and attain their full measure of development

requirements with which the physical world is but little concerned, and which men have generally agreed to call spiritual. These carry in their train that supreme faculty of which only such faint foreshadowings are given in any stage of life below the human, that we may almost say it is peculiar to man—viz. *the moral sense.* To this we must presently return, but, in the first place, it is important to notice two things—(1) that since, on the theory of evolution, it is in man that we find the truest exemplification of the capabilities of organic life, it is in man we ought to look for the solution, so far as it is discernible, of the problems of that life; (2) that his pre-eminence does not emancipate him from sacrifice, but, on the contrary, brings out in a much clearer light all its anomalies and paradoxes. It will be necessary to say a few words under each of these heads.

(1.) The study of life in its most elementary forms is of comparatively recent date, and opens a region of research peculiarly suitable to the proclivities of modern thought. We of the nineteenth century love to go back to beginnings, at any rate as near to them as we can get, and we

believe that by so doing we attain a very much truer appreciation of what has followed upon the beginnings than would otherwise be possible. No doubt this is very true; but, as with all other truths, if too exclusively dwelt on, it leads us astray. To judge of what a thing really is, we need to look at sequels rather than origins; and if we find that a very lowly beginning, which, viewed by itself, would lead us to form equally lowly anticipations as to its future possibilities, unfolds, on the contrary, into great and far-reaching results, we are, as a rule, impressed by a sense of the power which must have lain hidden in what appeared of such feeble promise. It is strange that so obvious a consideration should have been frequently overlooked in the surveys made of organic life. The theory of evolution, in its modern acceptation, has been very generally thought to detract from the dignity of man. Surely it should rather lead us to gaze with wonder and awe at the intrinsic power and majesty of the life which lay folded in so humble a germ. In a "self-made" man, who has risen to a position of high honour, we perceive a far greater force of character and extent of ability

than in a man who, having from the first the advantages of birth, wealth, and culture, has achieved the same distinction. In like manner, the fact that organic life, starting as we believe it started, as in every individual case we know it does now start, from a minute speck of protoplasmic substance, has reached the marvellous stage of development that man displays, gives us such a proof of the apparently unlimited potentialities of life as no theory of a "special creation" of man could ever afford.

But to accept this descent or ascent of man from the lowest forms of organic life, entails the inevitable consequence that we must regard him as the best exponent of the capabilities of that life, just as a full-grown oak is the best exponent of the capabilities of an acorn. And unless we ascribe the life of self-conscious reason and will, which is what we chiefly mean when we speak of human life, to a different origin from that highly differentiated physical life which is its correlative, and, so far as we know, equally essential to the perfect whole, we must allow that the potentiality of the one as well as of the other existed in those elementary living forms which were man's

earliest progenitors. Of these or similar forms abundant examples are extant, and had we not such striking evidence to the contrary, no stretch of imagination would enable us to see in them the almost boundless promise which has been verified.[1] Bearing in mind that it has been verified, and that consequently anything which in man solves, or gives some help towards solving, the problems of organic life as presented in him, applies in appropriate measure to that lower creation, of which he is the roof and crown, let us turn to see what aspect sacrifice presents, as viewed in its relation to human life.

(2.) Certainly, at first sight, one that is full of sadness and perplexity. The conditions obtaining throughout the rest of the organic world, though in some respects greatly modified, are by no means inoperative, and the "struggle for life," and its concomitant, "the survival of the fittest" (entailing, of course, the perishing of the nonfit),

[1] The evidence principally referred to is that afforded by embryology. To those who have at all appreciated the significance of the fact that in the life-history of every human individual the whole chasm is bridged between a single microscopic cell, and a full-grown man with a man's physical and mental powers, there is no difficulty in ascribing to the race a similar development.

produce among mankind the same results as they produce elsewhere, only that the hardness and cruelty of the conditions stand out in much stronger relief because of the greater value of that which is sacrificed. This is the case, even when the ordinary working of the rule holds good, and the less fit give place to the more fit. When an individual human being goes under in the conflict, or when an inferior race is crowded out, disappearing at the contact of that higher civilisation which demands so many victims both within and without its own circle, we feel that even though neither the individual nor the race has reached the high-water mark of human capabilities, there has nevertheless been a sacrifice of possibilities far transcending any with which the range of lower organic life makes us acquainted. But what touches us with an even keener sense of waste and injustice, is when the converse of the ordinary rule is presented, and we see apparently not the less fit sacrificed to the more fit, but the more fit to the less fit. Wherever man has risen above the savage state, we meet to a greater or less extent with this anomaly: that the weak, the sickly, the decrepit in mind or body, are cared

for and preserved at the cost of the strong, the healthful, and the intelligent; and the higher the stage of mental and moral culture which society at large has reached, the more frequent and striking do such sacrifices become. Our great western civilisation abounds with instances of them, and it is the noblest natures, those whose unimpeded self-realisation would, we think, most benefit society at large, who are most impelled to make them. Nor is it only the noble sacrifices of noble natures that we have to take into account; a man may "sacrifice himself" (how common an expression it is!) to pleasure, to wealth, to fame, to any object personal or impersonal which calls out towards itself his personal energies. There seems, in fact, to be an inward constraint, a compulsion, a *necessity* laid on man when he has arrived at a certain stage of development to sacrifice himself knowingly to some one or to something, not by any means always to the intrinsically worthiest object, but to that which, owing to some individual idiosyncrasy, appeals to him most strongly. Shall we say of this inward compulsion, this conviction of man that only by foregoing what seems to be self-realisation, he is

able most truly to fulfil himself, that it is a sign his life is not free? Let us take an analogy from lower nature, for life does not, because it is self-conscious, cease to bear the impress of those great general characteristics which are distinctive of all life.

When the vertebrate embryo is impelled by the law of its being to take upon itself those changes which will result in its becoming a fully formed vertebrate animal, and cannot result in its becoming anything else, we do not say that its passing through these undeviating preliminary stages shows that its life is not free. Rather, as we contemplate the beauty and symmetry of the perfected form to which they lead, we say that it is attained because the life was free, free to develop, to fulfil that law of its being which has resulted in such noble maturity. And, stating the case more generally, whenever we perceive a developing life impelled to pass through some particular phase, even if it should so happen that we do not yet know the final form to which the whole process of development will lead, we are convinced that we see in action the law by which it is to be reached. Applying this general

observation to the particular case of conscious sacrifice in human life, if we see that, arrived at a certain stage of development, there is invariably an inward compulsion to make such sacrifice, it is clear, quite apart from ethical considerations, that here is an indication of a law of man's life, a law which must be fulfilled if maturity is to be attained and the promise of human nature to see fruition.

Apart from ethical considerations also, it is possible to see in what way this law might be, and to some extent is, not only in its results but in its action, one of liberty. Conscious sacrifice, the sacrifice of a being who knows what he is doing when he makes the sacrifice, is often full of pain, full of perplexity, full even of apparent despair; but the moment it assumes the form of a direction of our personal activities upon any object of affection, be it personal or impersonal, the pain, the perplexity, the despair are transformed. Sacrifice appears then as the strongest and most satisfying expression of our own nature, a form—and the most complete form—of self-realisation. It is not necessary to insist at any length upon this truth, which is a matter of common experience. That it is so, is the most

convincing proof that far from sacrifice being always forced, it may be, and frequently is, the spontaneous expression of self-conscious life, including therefore, at this stage, the element of freedom of which before it seemed devoid.

So far, then, keeping before us the thought of life only, and excluding that of will, we have been able to see that in sacrifice, as exemplified in man, freedom as well as necessity bears its part. But we have reached a point when the consideration of the volitional element can no longer be postponed. It might be, perhaps, if man were never conscious of any internal conflict in his manner of fulfilling that law of his being which is expressed in sacrifice; but such a conflict is one of his most frequent experiences, and the way in which he puts an end to it is by an effort of the will, often a very strenuous and long-continued effort, resulting apparently not in helping him to realise the potentialities of his life more fully, but in leading him to forego them. That which we have now to take into consideration is, therefore, the meaning of the part played by the will in self-conscious sacrifice, and the first step in our inquiry is to investigate the

relation (1) between will and life in general, and (2) between self-conscious life and will.

(1.) We have already said that will presupposes life. Our experience of will is confined to its manifestation in living creatures. We may now add that it appears to be coextensive with the range of life; in other words, wherever we find a living creature we also find a creature prompted to action, not only by external causes, but also by some inward spring of power. The "voluntary" movements of the lowliest organisms, of the amœba for instance, give an example of what is meant. This creature responds to external stimulus, to an electric shock, or the touch of some particle suitable for food; but it also executes movements which, so far as can possibly be ascertained, are not due to any external stimulus whatever; and it is for this reason they have received the name of "voluntary." No other epithet seems adequately to describe their entirely spontaneous character. It may be said, however, that since purely vegetable organisms appear incapable of voluntary movements, such organisms afford no evidence of the existence of that spontaneous or self-determining element

which all animal life undoubtedly exhibits, and therefore half the organic world is devoid of it. This objection is based on a somewhat superficial view of the matter. It leaves out of account the fact that self-adaptation is quite as characteristic of vegetable as of animal life; and self-adaptation is, as we have seen, the active result of that inward impulse towards self-realisation which is the spontaneous element in all organic life. Therefore, though purely vegetable organisms exhibit no such indications of unconscious will as "voluntary" movements, this fact should be taken as due to the special way in which their special life has adapted itself to the environment, and therefore rather as a proof of spontaneity than of the reverse. It should be remembered also in this connection that in those strange and suggestive organisms, among the lowest in the scale of life, which cannot be classed as decisively either plant or animal, voluntary movements occur; and the cessation of them in the purely vegetable—which are the higher—forms can therefore hardly be taken as other than a sign that the spontaneity which prompted them has found a more appropriate outlet in rest than in motion.

If, however, we thus make will coextensive with life, and consequently unconscious and unintelligent when and in so far as life is unconscious and unintelligent, the relation between the two appears clearly to be of the kind existing between expression and what is expressed. Will expresses and life is expressed; and so long as life has not passed beyond the unconscious stage, it is not possible to conceive of any internal conflict arising as to the mode of its expression; life and will are in perfect accord.

(2.) The case is different, however, when we come to the second head of our inquiry, the relation between *self-conscious life* and will. In common with all life, self-conscious life seeks to realise to the utmost its own potentialities, and does so through the will. So far there is no difference; but in unconscious life the sole hindrance to freedom of development lies in the adverse pressure of external conditions, and these alone, therefore, prevent unconscious will from being free. External conditions operate also in the case of self-conscious life and will; but it is not difficult to see that here lack of freedom may be due also to an internal cause non-existent

at a lower stage. In a being endowed with self-conscious reason, but of finite capacities and gradual development, it seems inevitable that he should require time and the discipline of external conditions in order that he may learn what the potentialities of his life really are, and what direction his development must take in order that they may be most fully and perfectly realised. Until he has learned this, his life may be regarded as tentative, and his will, which is its active expression, is tentative also. But the tentative activity of self-conscious and intelligent life may easily take a direction other than that in which the most adequate realisation of the life, and consequently its greatest freedom, lies. for reason also is feeling its way, and the self-knowledge which is essential to rightly directed activity, is as yet in too elementary a stage to be safely depended on. Wrongly directed activity ensues, an expression of the life which is not really suitable to the life, and impedes its further development, and this (since the life is self-conscious) is felt as want of freedom.

Ideal freedom of will consists in the will being the spontaneous and perfectly adjusted

activity of the life which it presupposes and of which it is the expression; and in the case of self-conscious and intelligent life this includes the adequate expression of a fully informed reason, and of all those personal energies by which a self-conscious and intelligent life is characterised. In such a case choice would be excluded because the life, and the will which is its expression, would be no longer tentative. Self-realisation would not seem to lie perhaps in this, or perhaps in that direction, but in a well-defined and clearly perceived path, to follow which would be at once the attainment of liberty and the fulfilment of law. This is not, of course, our usual conception of freedom of will. We regard it rather as existing in the power of forcing our life into this or that mould as we like, forgetting or never having understood that there can only be one course of development which will issue in perfect self-realisation, and therefore only one course in which we can truly experience freedom.

That freedom, at the self-conscious stage, should be consistent with, nay, should actually lie in this confinement to *one course*, strikes us

perhaps as too paradoxical to be true. There is no paradox really; its appearance is due to a misapprehension which the conclusions reached at an earlier stage of the argument should enable us to clear away. For since, as we have seen, an ideally free finite life is doubly conditioned, from without by the environment, and from within by its own potentialities, and this no less at the self-conscious than at the unconscious stage, so also the will, which is the active expression of such a life, must equally be conditioned. In other words, it must be law-abiding, just as the life which it expresses must be law-abiding. Nor even if we endeavour to carry our thoughts beyond the limitations of the finite, and to conceive the infinitely free will of a life of infinite freedom, do we escape law. As we have seen, the liberty ascribed to the Divine Life (when we attempt to form a definite idea of its meaning) consists in that life being absolutely law-including, in the fullest and completest sense of the words a law unto itself. The Divine Will, the active expression of this absolutely law-including life of infinite freedom, is therefore itself an expression of law, of the undeviating, all-

including law of the Divine Life. It is for this reason that theologians find themselves forced into the acknowledgment that God "cannot" will certain things. He "cannot," they say, will injustice, unholiness, cruelty. What they mean is, that if the Divine Life be absolutely just, holy, and loving, the Divine Will, which is its active expression, must be the same. It is inconceivable that a life, infinitely free because it is infinitely law-including, should ever enter upon any mode of expression not in perfect and absolute accord with itself.

This, however, is not the place to enter upon theological considerations. To those who believe in the existence of God, all metaphysical inquiries must finally lead up to and merge in theology; but we are at present taking our stand on the lower ground of observation and induction, believing that if here we can find firm footing, we shall have prepared the way for those further and higher flights which it is dangerous to attempt without a *point d'appui* in the region of experience.

The position we have at present reached is this: The will is the active expression of life,

and in the case of an ideally free though finite life is its perfect and adequate expression. In the case of unconscious life, if its development be impeded through defective external conditions, its active expression (the will) is impeded also. Neither is free, but they are not in disaccord. In the case of self-conscious intelligent life subject to gradual development, the reason is during all the earlier stages of such development inadequate to keep the will rightly directed, and consequently the latter may easily go astray, with the paradoxical result, that life is self-forced into a course of activity not suitable to it, and therefore impeding its further development.

This being the case, we should expect (following the analogy of life in lower stages, where a fresh difficulty is invariably met by some fresh effort at self-adaptation), that the impulse to self-realisation, which is at the root of all forms of self-adaptation, would not here either be found wanting. We should anticipate the appearance of some new power in the life, by means of which the dangerous deficiency of reason might be supplied, and the life be at liberty to pursue its true course of development. Such a power we

find in the *moral sense*. It is not all that we—many of us, at any rate—find in it, but it is the aspect whose consideration is most relevant to our subject, and, moreover, one which is strikingly and incontestably true. The progress of mankind from barbarism to civilisation would have been impossible, had not the "categorical imperative" pointed out a way which Reason could not yet discern,—could not, when pointed out, justify by any logical process, but yet in accepting which, dimly recognised that she found her true fulfilment. Thus, between the moral sense and Reason in that higher signification ignored by so many modern writers, there is no conflict, but only a difference of function. The moral sense complements, sustains, inspires Reason, calls out in her a consciousness of higher potentialities, defends her against her own defectiveness while those potentialities are in process of development, and seems, indeed, to be the very voice of the higher Reason herself, not yet recognising her own utterance. But between the moral sense and Reason in that mutilated form in which authors like Mr. Kidd present it to us —Reason reduced to the logical faculty—con-

flict may, nay, it would seem must, occur; for the function of the moral sense being to protect the developing life of man from the misdirection of his will resulting from an imperfectly informed and consequently ill-judging logical faculty, the demands of the two can scarcely be expected always to coincide.

Though of extreme importance in other connections, it matters nothing to us here whence the moral sense derives its authoritative character. That character exists; it has, on the whole, been recognised in the most thorough of all ways—viz. submission—and has found its justification in the social progress of mankind, in the furtherance, that is, of human development, and consequently of human self-realisation. We cannot, then, go far wrong in regarding the "ought" of the categorical imperative as the yet unrecognised, or but dimly recognised, indication in man's nature of the direction in which his freedom lies. And we shall be confirmed in this view of the matter if we endeavour to probe what the sense of "ought" means in characters emancipated from the servile fear of consequences. We shall find that at bottom it consists in a deeply rooted

conviction that by disregarding it we are mutilating the "higher self" within, are refusing a form of self-realisation, not happier, perhaps, or in all respects fuller, but *better*.

These observations on the moral sense may have seemed a digression from our main line of thought; but it is not so in reality. Our object is to discover the meaning of the part played by the will in self-conscious sacrifice; and therefore it is of the highest relevancy to ascertain the place held in the life of man by the moral sense, because the method of operation of the latter is almost invariably through voluntary self-sacrifice. For the sake of some object personal or impersonal, child, wife, country, religion, truth, knowledge, a man feels that he "ought" to give up the fulfilment of desires centring in himself, the satisfaction of impulses to gratify which would otherwise be his natural tendency, and which he cannot, perhaps, logically prove to be less defensible than those in whose favour he sets them aside. It is worthy of observation, however, that the sense of "ought" never interferes to bolster up the pretensions of any impulses towards forms of self-realisation not sanctioned by the moral

sense. A man never feels that he *ought* to give rein to impulses of lust, fraud, cruelty, slander, or even ambition, though they may be so strong that he declares he "*must*" do so; and may succeed in justifying them to himself by some ingenious process of special pleading.[1] Afterwards, unless through frequent and persistent lapses moral deterioration has set in, shame and remorse arise to vindicate those claims of the higher self which he has disregarded, thus impeding his own development and bringing his life into bondage. Our common parlance bears out what is said. We speak readily of slaves to ambition, to avarice, to passion, never of slaves to contentment, generosity, or temperance, however completely they may be the rule of life.

We shall do well not to pass too hurriedly over this apparently trite observation, for the truth to which it witnesses has a most important bearing on our subject. Whence comes it that certain impulses, powerful in themselves, and

[1] In the case of uneducated persons and of children, the dictates of the moral sense take rather a negative than a positive form. The child perceives earlier that he "ought *not*" to do certain things than that he "*ought*" to do certain others; and the savage, the child-man, probably resembles him in this respect.

whose gratification undoubtedly has the appearance of a form of self-realisation, lead to "slavery," whereas resisting them, even at the cost of much pain and difficulty, is confessedly the road to liberty, lifts the life on to a higher plane of action, and gives it a wider and more powerful scope? Various answers have been formulated to this question. From our point of view there can be but one. The former course, that of setting at naught the moral sense, is in contradiction to the law of development of human life. Therefore liberty—unrestrained self-realisation—is not possible if it be adopted; whereas the second course, that of obedience to the moral sense, is in consonance with the law of development, and is therefore the key to a region of unlimited freedom.

The effort required to enter this region is due to what we have called the tentative stage of self-conscious life, that which man has at present reached. He is not sure in what direction his life will best find its expression; and, therefore, to abandon any course which holds out promise of self-realisation appears like self-mutilation, almost like self-slaughter. But the acceptance

of the method of self-sacrifice is the recognition by the will (the active expression of man's self-conscious nature) that freedom lies not in licence, but in law; that not in any direction, but in one well-defined path of development he will attain to complete self-realisation. And the supreme function of the moral sense is to bring about this voluntary recognition of law, to enable man to feel, even when he cannot see, the meaning of liberty.

That the mandates of the moral sense may be disregarded we all know, and in this fact it is often supposed that the proof of moral freedom lies. It would be far truer to regard it as the possibility of moral bondage. Certainly moral choice implies self-conscious intelligence, and is therefore so far a step on the road to higher freedom than unconscious life could ever attain; but hesitation between good and evil implies defective knowledge, imperfect reason, ill-balanced energies. These are not concomitants of freedom, and whenever the goal of human development is attained, man will be morally free, not because he can choose, but because he has no need to choose; the spontaneous activities of his whole

nature will have resolved themselves into a perfect and conscious harmony.

We have shown that the highest potentialities of human life, those in realising which it realises its greatest freedom, are indicated by the moral sense, and that the means of realising them lies in obedience to the mandates of the moral sense. But we have now to ask: Does this obedience, does the kind of self-sacrifice demanded, lead to the abandonment of any other potentialities which human life originally had? Because, if so, we shall be bound to confess that its self-realisation has been to some extent stunted.

The first and most obvious consideration which confronts us is, that since man is still in process of development, since from whatever point of view we regard him we cannot assert that he has reached the full measure of perfection of which he is capable, it is exceedingly difficult to frame any satisfactory answer to this question. There are stages in the embryological development of an organism when some parts seem to be growing and nourishing themselves at the expense of other parts, when a disproportion is apparent which, were it final, would be fatal to the nice adjust-

ment of all organic functions which we find in the adult form. Man has not yet attained the adult stage, and therefore we must hesitate in advancing any opinion as to what that stage will ultimately imply. Nevertheless, in the case of the race collectively, and of by far the greater number of individuals composing it, we may certainly with truth assert that, on the whole, the moral sense not only indicates the direction in which lie the highest potentialities in the life of man, but also fosters and preserves all other distinctively human potentialities, whether they be physical, mental, or social. It prevents deterioration as well as incites to progress.

In the case of some individuals, however, there seems to be an exception to the general rule. Those who, for the sake of other members of the race, or of some abstract and perhaps unattainable ideal, forego intellectual achievement, power which they might rightly and usefully wield, the realisation of capacities which cry aloud for satisfaction, and yet which must be denied if the imperative demand of the moral sense for self-sacrifice is to be complied with—what are we to say to such as these? In truth, if our horizon be bounded by

the horizon of this present life we can say but little, for there is nothing to show that such individuals benefit either themselves or the race at large by their conduct. Nevertheless the truth remains, that sacrifice of this kind is undoubtedly felt to be in accordance with the deepest and most searching requirements of self-realisation; a fact which seems to indicate that the individual as well as the race is still to some extent in embryo, has yet to attain to that complete stage when all the paradoxes of his development shall be explained.

One last remark appears to be called for. It is not the moral sense alone which impels to sacrifice. As we have before said, man may sacrifice himself to unworthy objects. Sacrifice is a law of his nature which seems to show that his life is not its own centre. The moral sense does not make the law, but finding it in action indicates its rightful application; and when "ought" becomes "must," because the fulfilment of the moral law to the extent to which it is perceived truly expresses what the man *is*—is recognised in fact as self-realisation, then, according to the measure of the recognition, there is liberty.

THE RELATION OF CHOICE TO FREEDOM

We have made an attempt to approach the difficult subject of freedom from the standpoint of biology, and have found that an ideally free life is a life of unrestrained self-realisation, which in a finite being can only take place in a defined course. Consequently ideal free-will, the active expression of the ideal free life of a self-conscious being, lies in the intelligent direction of all the personal energies into this course, the resultant activity being the spontaneous and adequate expression of the whole nature. In such a case we saw that choice would be excluded; freedom would have swallowed up choice. Until this stage is reached, however, what place does choice hold? What is its relation to that freedom which will end by annihilating it? And is its existence a sign that we are under necessity, or that we are free?

If we put aside all metaphysical predilections and allow ourselves to be guided only by the teaching of experience, we shall certainly say that it is a sign we are both—under necessity because we are compelled to choose, free because the outcome of choice is a spontaneous activity.

It is strange how our persistent desire for logical finish is continually driving us to one-sided, and therefore untrue, conclusions. In the age-long controversy over free-will it is so much easier to be either necessarians or libertarians than to be guilty of the paradox of declaring ourselves on both sides at once, or rather steering an apparently impossible course between the two. Nevertheless, in this as in other matters, the difficult and much-abused *via media* is, after all, the surest, and if not always logically defensible, is nevertheless in a higher sense absolutely reasonable.

In the present instance, however, the logic of the position is not so hopeless as might be supposed. A little reflection will convince us that the power of choice cannot, as so many persons seem to think, be synonymous with freedom, because choice itself is not a matter of choice,

but necessity. We do not choose whether we shall choose; we *must* choose. Of two courses open to a man, he may take one or the other, or neither. But supposing him to remain passive, he has none the less exercised his power of choice; he has chosen not to act. If he cannot escape from choosing, however earnestly he may desire to do so, he is certainly under compulsion in some sense.

But there is another aspect of the question which leads irresistibly to the same conclusion. Suppose a man with two courses open to him, and suppose, instead of selecting one *or* the other, he wants to pursue both, how is the fact that this power of choice can only be exercised in such a way as to preclude the possibility of his doing what he really desires reconcilable with its being another name for freedom? Nor is such a case at all recondite or unpractical. Many a man would like to live a life of ease and grow famous at the same time; but he cannot. *Either* the life of ease and mediocrity *or* the life of toil and fame, not both. Again, many a man would be delighted to gratify himself by yielding to intemperate pleasures, and yet not miss the honour

and consideration due to virtue. But again it is impossible. Either self-indulgence and its wages or self-restraint and its reward, not both. Here again, therefore, the very exercise of choice implies a measure of compulsion—*i.e.* of necessity.

At the same time it quite as evidently implies a very different element. Whether I shall act in one way or another way or not act at all, together with all the consequences which depend on my decision, to me at any rate is undetermined till I determine it. In other words, I bring to pass, so far as I am concerned, a condition of things which without my intervention would have had no existence. How does this fact bear upon freedom?

In asking this question we enter upon an inquiry larger in its scope than that of human activity, for if it is true that we have the power to make actual what was before only possible; we assert that the universe is one within whose limits possibilities exist. This, as has been forcibly pointed out by Professor James, is the true point at issue between determinism and indeterminism. The latter acknowledges that "*somewhere* possibilities exist and form a part of

truth. Derterminism, on the contrary, says that they exist *nowhere*, and that necessity on the one hand and impossibility on the other are the sole categories of the real. Possibilities that fail to get realised are for determinism pure illusions: they never were possibilities at all. There is nothing inchoate, it says, in this universe of ours, all that was, or is, or shall be in it having been from eternity virtually there."[1]

Professor James further very appositely points out that "what divides us into possibility or anti-possibility men is different faiths or postulates—*postulates of rationality*. To this man the world seems more rational with possibilities in it, to that man more rational with possibilities excluded; and talk as we will about having to yield to evidence, what makes us monists or pluralists, determinists or indeterminists, is at bottom always some sentiment like this."[2]

To the present writer the world certainly appears more rational with than without possibilities. Consequently, in this essay they are postulated. The question before us is not

[1] "The Will to Believe," p. 151. The Dilemma of Determinism.

[2] Ibid., p. 153.

whether they exist, but whether we can at all define the region in which they have their root.

Casting our eyes on the world about us, we search in vain for any indications of their existence save in connection with organic life. Rigid necessity appears to obtain within the inorganic universe *per se*. Nothing *there*, it seems, could happen otherwise than as it does happen. If we let a stone fall freely from a height, we can predict the exact spot where, in conformity with the law of gravitation, it will reach the ground. But let loose a bird from the hand, it may alight anywhere on the ground, on any tree, on any part of the housetop. There is an indefinite number of possibilities as to where it may come to rest. No less than the fall of a stone, the flight of the bird is in accordance with the law of gravitation, but the rigid necessity which appeared to characterise that law has disappeared. Though never ceasing to act, and to act in the same way, it leaves to the bird room for plenty of possibilities. It is not the rigidity of the law of gravitation, but want of spontaneity in the stone which renders its motion so different from

that of the bird. What is true of gravitation is true of every other of the great physical laws. Directly they come in contact with life they are revealed in a new light. The way is opened to possibilities, "things that may, but need not be."

It is also, in the case of self-conscious beings, open to choice; for such a being perceives that within his own sphere of activity there are various things that "may be," and that the realisation of some will preclude that of others. He behaves so as to give actuality to those possibilities which most appeal to him, and he does this knowingly. In other words, he *chooses*.[1] Choice is thus seen to be a necessary consequence of an order, including alike self-conscious intelligence and possibilities. The existence of the *order* limits the range of the possibilities, equally whether the latter are or are not capable of actualisation by human beings. In all cases they must be such as *could* become actual in the universe to which they belong. This fact has a most important bearing on the human aspect of the question.

[1] This, at any rate, is an adequate definition of choice when it has reference to ends to be attained. The choice of means by which the ends may be compassed wears a somewhat different aspect, discussed farther on.

Man wants to make actual all that he desires to be so. Perfect freedom would be the full power of accomplishing this desire (only another name, therefore, for complete self-realisation). The very first essential for attaining such freedom is that man's desires should be in harmony with the order of the universe, because the possibilities it affords, and those only, can be actualised.

Professor James, in the essay from which quotation has already been made, appears to think that we never do endeavour to actualise impossibilities. He asks—

"What are the alternatives which, in point of fact, offer themselves to human volition? What are these futures that now seem matters of chance? Are they not all of them *kinds* of things already here, and based in the existing frame of Nature? Is any one ever tempted to produce an *absolute* accident, something utterly irrelevant to the rest of the world?"[1]

These questions can only be answered in the negative with serious reservations. Possibly it could be shown (though in the region of ethics

[1] "The Will to Believe," p. 157. The Dilemma of Determinism.

even this is doubtful) that we never try to compass *ends* not based in the existing frame of Nature; but in all regions of experience the endeavour to attain our ends by entirely irrelevant *means* is frequent. The search for the "philosopher's stone" and savage "rain-making" are illustrations of this in the physical sphere; and all such attempts aim at neither more nor less than the production, not indeed of things, but of *connections* which are not based in the existing frame of Nature, "absolute accidents" therefore. Of course ignorance is the prime motor in all such endeavours, and the whole progress of science consists in a continual learning that accidental connections are non-existent, are not, in fact, among the possibilities of the universe.

The increasing power which man is able to wield as he gradually masters this lesson, the marvellous control which even now it enables him to exercise over the physical agencies of Nature, sufficiently demonstrate that his freedom in the physical sphere depends on his knowing how to make possibilities actualities by learning the law of their becoming so. It is during the

process of ascertaining the law that the question of means—*i.e.* choice between alternative courses of action by which the end may be compassed—presents itself. It cannot be said to do so either before or after this stage. While the accidental connection is believed in, any course of action may commend itself as the right one to pursue. When the true connection is discovered, doubt is non-existent and deliberation unnecessary. But between a man's abandonment of the illusory connection and his perception of the true one, there lies often a whole world of experience, in which the chief feature is the continual recurrence of the necessity to choose between alternative courses of action. Is this one or that one the more promising, the more likely to lead to the desired goal? If he selects the wrong one, he has to turn back and begin again, for he is sure sooner or later to come to an *impasse*, a point where he is compelled to realise that he cannot carry out his will, is definitely prevented from attaining the desired result. In the earlier stages of this tentative process he is troubled by a sense of confusion and bewilderment. His attempts are more or less haphazard, he does not realise

number,

any of which could be, none of which need be, some (unknown) of which will be, actualised. So far, therefore, there is indetermination. The "kind" of universe determines the "kind" of possibilities, but it does not detract in the least from their being no more than possibilities, things which may or may not be realised.

We must now apply these considerations in the region of ethics. The definition we have given of human freedom is, absolute self-realisation, the power to be, to do, and to know all that human nature is capable of being, doing, and knowing. According to that, the condition of man's freedom must lie in his perceiving and having power to actualise those possibilities, of the universe, which enable his own nature to so develop as to achieve complete self-realisation. An attempt to actualise a possibility not in harmony with the constitution of the universe, and by means of it to achieve freedom, is an attempt to establish a connection not based in the existing frame of Nature, and therefore unrealisable—an "absolute accident." Evil, it will be shown, stands in this relation to the universe and to man.

that he is in search of law, and trusts rather to stumbling accidentally on the right method. The confusion appears to be in the world without, but is in reality in the world within the man's mind, and only abates as by one failure and another he learns at any rate in what direction power to carry out his desire does *not* lie.

Thus in the physical region we see that, though the exercise of choice is not itself freedom, because it does not give the power to actualise possibilities, it is a necessary step on the road to freedom, inasmuch as it implies a perception that any means will not avail to attain the desired end, but only that whose connection with the end is part of the "existing frame of Nature." And here is distinctly foreshadowed that reconciliation between determinism and indeterminism which is supposed to be so hopeless, and which Professor James, though he holds the clue in his hand, declares to be impossible. If there be such a thing at all as a *universe*, an "existing frame of Nature," then into that frame only certain kinds of possibilities will fit. So far, therefore, there is determination. But of these certain kinds there may be an indefinite number,

any of which could be, none of which need be, some (unknown) of which will be, actualised. So far, therefore, there is indetermination. The "kind" of universe determines the "kind" of possibilities, but it does not detract in the least from their being no more than possibilities, things which may or may not be realised.

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At this point we are compelled to notice that however we may define "evil," it exists, and the question consequently arises, how, if it be not in harmony with the constitution of the universe, it can have become actual, because, as we have already seen, the kind of universe determines the kind of possibilities. It does so here. The universe is an *order;* but wherever there is order there is an implied possibility of disorder, and this being destructive of the order, is, with regard to it, evil, and the preventive of the realisation of capacities, which fulfilment of the order can alone achieve.

The bearing of this obvious fact will be better brought home to us by attempting some further investigation into the nature of good and evil as they affect the question of man's liberty—his unrestrained power to be, to do, and to know. If we can discover what chiefly conduces to and what chiefly hinders this full self-realisation, we shall obtain some very clear insight into the kind of order to which we belong, and the kind of disorder which its existence renders possible; nor will the quest prove either long or difficult. Wherever in the world of human beings we find

self-centred life, there we find life which is cramped, narrow, dwindling;—on the opposite course, therefore, to more complete development of its capacities and powers. There may be social as well as individual self-centredness. The family which thinks solely of the advancement of its own members, the "class" which regards solely its own well-being, the nation which looks only to its own interests, alike find themselves, sooner or later, decreasing in the power and influence which are the result of a healthy vitality, and the *sine quâ non* of a free activity. All the so-called "social problems" of the day have their root in that fatal propensity to self-centredness which is for ever opposing man's efforts towards fuller development. On the other hand, the life which embraces within the sphere of its own activity the activity and interests of other lives, finds itself enriched, enlarged, complemented; and this is equally true of individuals, classes, and nations. The larger, more comprehensive, in a word, more outgoing the life, the stronger, more vigorous, more complete it is. This fuller self-realisation is only attained, however, by a self-renouncement which often appears like self-

mutilation, and even self-slaughter. And yet the verdict of mankind is not doubtful that in such renouncement the highest satisfaction consists.

"Measured by self-sacrifice, by heroism," says a well-known and most suggestive writer, "every other good sinks not only into a lower place, but becomes evidently of a lower kind. Nothing else in the same full and perfect sense deserves or receives the name of good. The homage of all hearts unequivocally affirms this title. Even when there is not manhood enough to imitate, when the baser nature within us prefers the meaner course, the verdict of the soul is never doubtful. The pains of martyrs, or the losses of self-sacrificing devotion, are never classed among the evil things of the world. They are its bright places rather, the culminating points at which humanity has displayed its true glory and reached its perfect level. An irrepressible pride and gladness are the feelings they elicit: a pride which no regret can drown, a gladness no indignation overpower."[1]

This irrepressible pride and gladness bursting forth spontaneously at "the pains of martyrs or the losses of self-sacrificing devotion," what are

[1] Hinton, "Mystery of Pain," p. 12.

they but the pulsing of that fuller life to which mankind unceasingly aspires, an unmistakable token that the true road to self-realisation lies through self-renunciation? It cannot be otherwise, for only by the sacrifice of the self-centred life can a life be attained which reaches beyond the poor and narrow circle of individual capacities, or of family, or class, or national capacities, or (for here, indeed, lies the crucial point) the capacities of one puny race of beings inhabiting one corner of the mighty universe. What human self-realisation demands for its accomplishment is the embracing and being embraced within the widest possible circle of life, that which includes within itself and whose centre is the source of all being whatsoever. Only thus can man find an environment ample enough to respond to all his capacities, to develop to the full the powers which he feels latent within him and struggling to the birth. But that life whose centre is the source of all being, whose infinite comprehensiveness leaves nothing outside itself, is the divine life. What man's self-realisation demands, therefore, is that his life shall be centred in God. This alone is freedom, whatever conduces to it is *good*.

Self-centredness, which is the exact opposite to this, which, instead of admitting man to the widest circle of life, confines him within the narrowest, is bondage, and whatever conduces to it is *evil*.

Having arrived at this point, we can see clearly what function we must assign to choice during the process of development. It is that unavoidable exercise of the will which either trains and disciplines it for freedom or seals it for bondage. To be so appealed to by the self-centred life as to endeavour to make it actual—is to choose "evil," to choose to be a slave. To be so appealed to by the God-centred life—as to give up our being to be moulded on that vast scale—is to choose "good," to choose to be freemen; and continually, unceasingly from day to day, from hour to hour, it might almost be said from minute to minute, the momentous decision is being made.

"'Will you, or won't you, have it so?' is the most probing question we are ever asked; we are asked it every hour of the day about the largest as well as the smallest, the most theoretical as well as the most practical things. We answer by consents or non-consents, and not by words;"[1]

[1] James, "Principles of Psychology," vol. ii.

and that to which we are giving or from which we are withholding consent is our own liberty, the liberty of the sons of God to take their rightful place in their Father's house. It is, indeed, then "no wonder that these dumb responses should seem our deepest organs of communication with the nature of things and the effort demanded by them, the measure of our worth as men," for upon these responses and tha effort hang the eternal issues of our being.

We are, of course, but rarely conscious of this. We feel only that we have to choose between what seems arbitrary good and evil, the good often appearing the more difficult, the more unalluring, the more doubtful of conferring ultimate benefit, and yet laying upon us a constraining appeal to realise it which is wholly unlike any other appeal of which we are conscious. It is the appeal of our own nature to be allowed scope to live—nay, rather of the divine nature —on which, if the universe be the outcome of the divine activity and self-conscious beings its culminating product, our own is moulded, to live in us. And here lies the fundamental *raison d'être* of the categorical imperative, the *ought*

felt so long before any account of it can be given by reason, felt still when allegiance to it is refused, when to the logical faculty it is unable to justify itself. That sense of obligation, misunderstood and perverted as it so often is, is nevertheless the pledge and token of the freedom to be attained, the indication of the direction in which it lies. But before it is attained, what was called in a former essay[1] the tentative stage has to be passed through, the stage in which the developing reason is uncertain what course will truly tend to the fulness and perfection of life which it dimly apprehends. This is the stage of *choice*, the stage at which good and evil both present themselves as possible means of self-realisation. While it lasts the function of the moral sense is to supplement the inadequacy of reason by enabling man to feel even when he cannot understand what course to follow; and the function of choice is to prevent his following it blindly, to give him the means of himself working out his own freedom, the only way in which it can be attained by a self-conscious being.

This fact does not, however, itself constitute

[1] "The Law of Liberty," *Contemporary Review*, April 1897.

freedom. The prisoner is not free because he longs for liberty, nor yet because a way of compassing it dawns upon him. He is free only when his chains are actually loosed and the doors of his cell unbarred, and he steps forth under the open heaven. In like manner man is not free because he is more or less conscious of boundless capacities of being which he could utterly appreciate and delight in; nor yet is he free when he begins to perceive by what means he may ultimately attain this perfect self-realisation. He is free only when it *is* attained. In the meanwhile, that dominant value which the greatest teachers of all ages and of all countries have set upon *character*, and which is justified alike in the great events of history, and in the ordinary occurrences of everyday life, indicates clearly enough our recognition that *to be* is the test of worth, not to do or to know, and that because being must eternally condition all knowledge and all activity. What we actually are, therefore, determines the measure of freedom to which we here and now attain. What we ideally are—what as human beings we have it in us to become—determines the kind of freedom

which belongs to man in his perfection. The nature of this ideal liberty we dimly feel (rather than, in any true sense of the word, understand) in all regions of our experience. For this reason the great characteristic instincts of mankind are, on the whole, to be trusted. We may, and do, blunder sadly as to the means we take to satisfy them, but we are not mistaken in our conviction that they "ought" to be satisfied. Such instincts are the thirst for knowledge, for righteousness, for happiness, for larger experience physical, mental, and moral, for immortality, for God.

The conclusion at which we have arrived, then, may be summed up in the statement that man's freedom is not now actual but possible, and that he must himself render it actual by bringing his life into conscious harmony with the ideal order of Nature—the order as it exists in the divine conception, and gradually dawns upon the mind and heart of man, partly through extension of knowledge and experience, but chiefly through obedience to those inward monitions of the moral consciousness from which no human being is exempt. And the fact that man's self-realisation can only be accomplished by a self-renouncing

obedience, which brings him into union with nature and with the God of Nature, precludes it from being selfish. The supreme realisation of all those aspirations of human beings which are so deep in their significance and so wide in their scope—the Absolute Truth, Beauty, and Holiness —exist in the Divine Being alone. Their realisation in man is the realisation of the divine in him, so that freedom, when it is attained, is not the freedom of an isolated individual life, but the participation of each such life in the freedom of the all-pervading, Infinite Life itself.

What has been above said to some extent answers a criticism received by the writer upon her former essay[1]—viz. that a sufficiently clear line of demarcation had not been kept between that freedom of choice which renders us capable of evil, and the freedom of a perfected nature to which the necessity of exercising choice no longer exists. From the standpoint of these essays we cannot thus regard freedom of choice apart from the nature which chooses. The power of moral choice is the symptom in self-conscious beings of a certain condition in the universe owing to

[1] "The Law of Liberty."

which evil is possible. That condition has already been described as consisting in the fact that the universe, because it is an order, includes among its possibilities that of disorder, or evil. In the case of self-conscious beings, in whom a certain independence is attained, the actualisation of this possibility must, if avoided, be consciously avoided. It must, therefore, present itself to them as a thing that might be. The reason why they do not recognise that its actualisation must prove a deathblow to freedom of development has already been several times stated, and it may again be repeated that it lies in the inadequacy of the as yet partially developed reason to understand the true bearings of life. Therefore, the moral sense has at first to be obeyed blindly, and successful rebellion against its authoritative mandates presents itself in the light of freedom. On the other hand, to an uncorrupted nature the instinct of obedience is felt to be healthy and trustworthy, that which "ought" to be followed even at the apparent cost of renunciation of liberty. The necessity of choice therefore arises. It is not something independent of freedom of nature, but a consequence of that freedom being only in

course of becoming, not having actually become, an accomplished fact. When it has so become, however, its maintenance will depend on a continuance of that clear vision which precludes a mistaken conception of liberty. In that case evil would not appeal to us any more than a path evidently leading away from a goal which we had with effort attained would appeal to us. Choice would be non-existent, not because there was no path, but because the notion of taking it would not enter into consideration. In the same way, when once we have attained freedom, and are absolutely convinced in what it consists, evil, which precludes it, meets with no response. The possibility of evil in a sense still exists, but it is one that we are not tempted to actualise. It has become a moral *im*possibility.

In any consideration bearing on human freedom, the fact that evil is not *now* a mere possibility—that it is actual and confronts us at every step—needs far closer investigation than it has here received, or than in a few concluding remarks can be given it. To say more with regard to its origin than has already been said in pointing out how such a possibility *could* become

actual, would be a venture of the wildest temerity. We know, alas!—unless we are most wilfully blind—that our race is tainted, that in some way man has failed in that self-abnegation which, though apparently a renouncement of, is in reality the way to full liberty, and we know also something of the fatal manner in which taints of nature are perpetuated by heredity. The result of this self-incurred and self-propagated bondage is twofold. Man finds that the actualisation of evil is fatally easy, and when there do exist barriers to its accomplishment, he feels them as a restraint upon liberty, because his tainted nature leans towards that which is its bane and blight, and strives to find therein what it never can—fuller self-realisation. And when this error is perceived, then man finds the actualisation of good hard and precarious, and there is wrung from him the cry whose bitter significance has come home to so many of us: "The good which I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do. Oh, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me?" The answer, given in the context to this quotation, announces a remedy declared by many to be not only worthless but

spurious, the delusion of a sick fancy. Perhaps this suggestion would be less ready if we had a deeper and clearer apprehension of what the remedy itself is, and in what its efficacy consists, And, as in the writer's conviction there is no other means of attaining that freedom to which man aspires, the present essay will be followed by an attempt to consider the meaning and bearings of the Christian ideal of liberty in a somewhat different manner from that usually adopted.

THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL OF LIBERTY

AN attempt to approach any of the great problems of existence from an avowedly Christian point of view is sure to arouse in many minds a strong antecedent presumption of the narrowness and partiality of treatment to be expected. This is, perhaps, one reason why the attempt itself is so seldom made in a way at all worthy of its deep importance. It is chilling to feel that our best efforts will be received with a contemptuous or compassionate smile. Another and a stronger reason, however, lies in the uneasy suspicion that the contempt or compassion may be rightly placed. The bulk of professing Christians hold but a slight and unworthy estimate of their own position in face of modern science and philosophy. They are far, indeed, from appreciating in this connection St. Paul's words to his Corinthian converts—"All things are yours," or even from

recognising (as one of the greatest theological scholars of our own day has recognised), the service which so-called "secular" knowledge can render to the Christian faith.[1] As Christians, they are but too apt to turn their backs upon it, and the result is a great loss to their own faith, and an entire impossibility of commending it intellectually to others. It has been often said —and it must be still more often felt—that one of the deepest needs of the age is an adequate Christian (not *Christianised*) philosophy. As yet, however, no thinker appears to have arisen equal to the task of presenting in a consistent whole the all-embracing truths of the religion of Christ under the aspect and in the language which modern thought could assimilate. The time is, perhaps, not yet ripe, and it may be that many consciously and unconsciously converging efforts, many hardly-contested conflicts, much painful sifting of the wheat from the chaff, must yet be undergone before the age is ready to receive the answer for which it longs. In the meanwhile

[1] "Christianity consists of the most central and significant truth concerning the universe, *intelligible only in connection with other truth not obviously Christian*, and accepted by many not Christians."—Hort, "The Way, the Truth, and the Life," p. 180.

it can only be productive of good if a careful attempt is made from time to time to face some one issue in the combined light of Christian and scientific truth.

First, however, a word is needed to elucidate the meaning of such an endeavour. It is not to "*reconcile*" science and religion. They do not need it. It is to remove the confusion of thought which makes such reconciliation appear necessary, and which too often arises from mental and spiritual indolence. It must further be borne in mind that the treatment of any subject from a confessedly Christian standpoint appeals primarily to Christians. It is they whose mental attitude should be most calculated to appraise justly the worth of the statement placed before them; and if they fail to do so, if they condemn what they should welcome, and accept what they should repudiate, thus giving convincing proof of their want of appreciation of their own intellectual position, is it any matter for surprise that non-Christians should fail to appreciate it also? It is but too true that the narrow, exclusive, and unintelligent way in which many Christians hold (if they can really be said to

hold), the great doctrines of their religion, renders them totally incapable of recognising its exceeding comprehensiveness. Thoughts which should not be new to them, which it would seem require no very extensive insight into the meaning of their own faith, and no more than just sympathy with and recognition of the increased and increasing light thrown by science on nature and on man, to render them in the highest degree inspiring and illuminative, are either rejected altogether, or accepted in a narrow and formal sense which deprives them of all their power.

Either narrow dogmatism, or uncertainty and doubtfulness, appear characteristic of the mental attitude of modern Christians, and the former is not so far removed from the latter as might at first be supposed. It is not uncommon to try and compensate for failing convictions by strong asseverations. And moreover, the lack of intelligent appreciation of their own doctrines makes Christians allow themselves in agnosticism, where it is neither needful nor wise, thus leaving them in no better position intellectually for facing the problem of existence than other agnostics. But this should not be.

However fully we may acknowledge, as, indeed, all the truest and deepest Christian thinkers do acknowledge, that, though the truth we have is "working and real truth to be thankfully accepted, yet [it is] truth surrounded by ignorance, founded on the unknown, conditioned by the unknown,"[1] we must yet carefully guard ourselves against falling into the error that, because an element of the unknown enters into all our knowledge, therefore we know nothing certainly or surely. There can be no greater departure from the true Christian position than this, and it is quite compatible with the formal and lifeless clinging to dogma which is the usual reproach cast against Christians by those who regard themselves as having emerged upon "the breezy plateau of free thought."

One of those points upon which Christians often mistakenly assume that they are left in doubt, is the purpose of man's creation, thus shutting themselves off from some of the clearest light which can shine upon this dark and perplexed world.

[1] Sermon preached at the Church Congress at Shrewsbury, by the Bishop of Rochester, 1896.

The central truth of the Christian revelation is the Fatherhood of God,—a Fatherhood not contingent on creation, but essential to the Divine Nature itself. As Father, therefore, God creates, and the ideal of creation is that which alone could satisfy Fatherhood—Sonship. There is no doubtfulness or obscurity in New Testament language on this point. "There is one God, the Father, of whom are all things and we unto Him, and one Lord Jesus Christ through whom are all things and we through Him."[1] Elsewhere He "through whom" we are, is spoken of as "the image of the invisible God . . . in whom all things were created,"[2] as the "Son whom He appointed heir of all things, through whom also He made the worlds,"[3] as the "Word who was in the beginning and was with God and was God."[4] The creation of "all things" in and through the Eternal Son shows clearly enough that the divine ideal for all, each according to its measure and capacity, is Sonship. To man, however, is given a special prominence; he is regarded as the representative

[1] 1 Cor. viii. 6.
[2] Col. i. 15, 16.
[3] Heb. i. 2.
[4] John i. 1.

and culmination of lower nature, and the whole tenor of New Testament language concerning him shows that the purpose of his creation is that in him the divine ideal may be consciously, intelligently, and voluntarily realised.

The object of the present essay is to consider, in the light of this great truth, the question which we have already twice approached from other standpoints—viz. the freedom of man; but before starting it will not be irrelevant to call attention to the stupendous difference which must be made in our mental attitude towards every problem of existence if we are willing to take up this position—*i.e.* if we are Christians. We assert that we know—not guess, or desire, or hope, but *know*—a great fundamental fact which, apart from the Christian revelation, is not known, the relation of the universe and of man to the power through which they came into being. There is no agnostic living who would not fully and heartily recognise that were such knowledge attainable, it would be of the first and last importance, that no branch of science, no period of history, no system of philosophy could be rightly viewed save in connection with

this supreme relation; and that if the necessity for investigation and research compelled us to lose sight of it for a time, and devote ourselves to the accumulation and classification of facts, those facts would never be really understood till we had been able so to rise above them as to perceive their bearing upon the great central truth in connection with which alone they have any significance. But then to the agnostic the possibility of such knowledge is a wild and baseless dream. He accepts the position of being unable to penetrate the fundamental bearing of any facts of history or science, because he believes that there is and can be no insight whatever into the relation of the cosmos to the unknowable power by which it exists. The Christian, on the other hand, asserts that, despite the inadequacy of the human mind to grapple with the whole vast truth which is expressed in this relation, the *kind* of relation has been disclosed, can be apprehended, and illuminates the entire field of knowledge and experience. What then shall be said of those Christians who, holding such a belief as this, and possessing the intellectual capacity to aid in demonstrating

its theoretical and practical bearings, yet allow in themselves such ignorance or such indifference that they make no single contribution to a work supremely affecting the mental and spiritual welfare of mankind?

It is surely time that we should rise to the height of our responsibility in this respect, and, if we indeed believe that we have the knowledge which we claim, spare no pains and no effort so to master the truths "not obviously Christian and accepted by many who are not Christians," that their relation to "the most central and significant truth of the universe," in whose light alone they can ever be rightly appreciated, may be made increasingly clear with every advance in science and philosophy.

Turning now from these general considerations to the subject of the present essay, we proceed to consider the meaning of human freedom as seen in the light of the divine ideal of creation—Sonship.

In the first essay in this volume[1] we approached the question of freedom of the will from the side of biology, laying down as our guiding principle,

[1] "The Law of Liberty."

that in order to understand what it means we must first gain a definite conception of freedom of life. This was seen to be necessary because will, in all its manifestations, is the active expression of life. We further saw that perfect freedom of life is synonymous with full self-realisation, and that in a finite being this full self-realisation is doubly conditioned—from within by its own potentialities, from without by the environment, consequently that in order to be unrestrained, development (where development is the law of life), must follow a definite course. We must now notice that if there be an ideal of creation, in that ideal all conditions have their source, and the measure of its realisation in any finite life determines the measure of freedom which the life attains. If the ideal be Sonship no adequate realisation is possible save where, as in man, self-conscious intelligence exists in a high degree, because the ideal of Sonship involves on the part of the Son a clear consciousness and understanding of his relation to the Father, and of the Father's relation to him. Man, who (in common with all living beings of which he has cognisance,) attains maturity through development,

can, whether individually or collectively, only arrive at this clear consciousness and understanding *gradually*. Till he has attained it, however, he is a stranger to those highest prerogatives and privileges of Sonship ideally his. His only course of free development then is that through which they are rendered actual, and his life being pre-eminently self-conscious, this course must be consciously pursued. To this end, it becomes necessary at a certain stage of his progress that the ideal should be manifested to him, for he could not consciously endeavour to realise an unperceived ideal: and here we encounter one great claim made by the Christian revelation. It asserts that Christ is the realisation of the divine ideal of Manhood, of that which every man—because he is a man—has it in him to become.

There are important points to be noticed before we can at all justly appreciate the scope and significance of this claim, particularly in its bearing on the question of freedom. The first, and perhaps the most essential, is that the relation of Christ to man is not primarily dependent on his need of restitution and redemption. Though at

more than one period this mistaken view has gained wide acceptance in the Church, it has never been universally held, nor is it that which best harmonises with the language and teaching of the New Testament. In our own day it is fraught with a great and special danger, for, at a time when man is learning, as he has never learned before, that he is not an isolated unit, but is bound by the closest ties to the rest of nature, so that he cannot consider the destiny of the one apart from the destiny of the other, the basing of his relationship to Christ on his own needs exclusively, places him in a solitary and self-centred position totally at variance with the rest of his experience and knowledge. It is hardly necessary to indicate, however, that such a self-centred view is quite untenable if the divine ideal of creation be Sonship. In that case the archetype of all creation, not of man only, is the Eternal Son, and the source and centre of its life is the Father. Man has his own place, and a very high one, in the universe which is the outcome of these conditions, but it is not central, and no theory which makes it so can be true to facts or sound in practice.

At the same time, the fact that man does need restoration, power to return to the true path of development from which he has deviated, takes, in the light of what has just been said, a most profound and far-reaching significance. Anything which happens to mar man's own perception of the divine ideal, to realise which is the purpose of his creation, yet more, which hinders or precludes his attainment of it, must produce effects more extensive than with his present knowledge and under his present conditions he can possibly appreciate. These effects cannot be confined to himself. According to the Christian view of him, corroborated by science so far as science at present extends, he gathers up within himself,—is an epitome as well as a development of,—all lower nature. The consequences of a deviation from the true line of development in man, then, if such deviation there have been, embrace within their scope more than man: they include all creation known to him.

This appears a somewhat sweeping assertion, but a little reflection will show that it is well founded. Wherever there is organic connection the truth holds good that "if one member suffer

all the members suffer with it." We see this exemplified in the case of all social relations, but perhaps in none more strongly than in that of members of the same family. If a son of the house rebels against parental authority, takes to self-willed, dissolute, ill-guided courses, the consequences are not confined to the injured father and the erring son: they are felt throughout the family. There is sorrow, pain, perplexity, straitened means very likely, and consequent material suffering. Even the little children, ignorant and innocent, do not escape the consciousness that some cloud overshadows their home. It is unwise to strain too far any analogy between things human and things divine. Nevertheless, science and revelation combine to tell us that there is organic connection throughout nature: and if the ideal of creation be Sonship, that connection must necessarily be better represented by the relationship subsisting between members of a family than by any other. Thus, though we can but imperfectly trace the fundamental details of man's connection with the rest of nature, and are consequently unable to state with any exactitude in what way his deviation from the true

line of development has reacted upon it, we can nevertheless perceive that their lot is cast in together, and that his disordered relation to the Father of all in some measure affects all, so that not he alone suffers, but "the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain with [him] until now."

These considerations are not a digression from our subject, as may at first sight appear. They enable us, by the definiteness and scope which they give to our conception of man's place in the cosmos, to rise to a far more adequate idea of what full self-realisation,—*i.e.* perfect freedom of life,—means in his case than we could otherwise do. For if, indeed, man, by virtue of his capacity for conscious Sonship, gathers lower nature up into himself and represents it to God, then we understand that his development must culminate in a relation towards the "material" world which we see but very faintly shadowed forth at present. Those conditions, which we call material, and which frequently seem to have so much power to thwart and retard human progress, would appear in a very different light if they were so perfectly understood by us that we could render

them unfailingly subservient to the spiritual life of which they are the expression. Now they too often seem to militate against it, and the consequence is a limitation upon man's power of self-realisation which, could we suppose it permanent, is not compatible with what is made known to us of the divine ideal for him. In this connection it is important to notice that to Christ, who is the manifestation of that ideal, material limitations frequently appeared to be non-existent, though at other times they were unflinchingly submitted to. But in Him the spiritual and the material were evidently in their true relation to one another, and therefore He could and He did do whatever the life of spirit demanded. This is the explanation of much that is usually called "miraculous" in the Gospel records. It was the vindication of the liberty of manhood, the declaration that the sons of God were meant to be free of their Father's house; and therefore it was no contravention, but a revelation of the true order of nature.

In considering the ideal of manhood as presented in Christ, however, we have to remember that its manifestation took place under external conditions which were not merely those of im-

maturity (this must inevitably have been the case, because, as we have seen, the manifestation of the ideal was necessary in order to the attainment of maturity), but of imperfection—disordered conditions. We have observed before that an order contains an implied possibility of disorder, the kind of disorder depending, of course, upon the kind of order.[1] The existence of a filial order, therefore, implies the possibility of just such disorder as is designated by self-will and self-centredness, just such as is characteristic of man and of the world as man sees it. But under these conditions all man's faculties are impaired, his reason clouded, his moral sense warped, his spiritual insight marred, and the revelation of the ideal cannot be to him what it would have been; he cannot see it in its power and beauty as he would have done had he never entered this abnormal state. It is not merely that he has to grow into adequate apprehension of the ideal revealed,—that must always have been the case, for, in proportion as it became more fully realised in himself, he would appreciate more fully its perfect manifestation; but his difficulty is far

[1] "The Relation of Choice to Freedom."

greater and more radical than this. It is that his development has not proceeded upon the true lines, and therefore unnatural conditions have appeared. Under these the ideal had to be revealed, adapting itself to the needs not only of partial, but of abnormal development, for otherwise it would have been unintelligible.

In order to enter into the full significance of this fact, we must pause for a few moments upon a special aspect of the ideal itself. We have said that it is divine sonship. The archetype of the creature is the Creator, and therefore the being who sums up in himself the powers of the creature, in whom they reach a higher development, and exhibit a larger scope than at any previous stage, will reflect the creative attributes. As a conscious son of God man is associated in the work of creation. As proof of this, we need but refer the reader to what was said in the essay on "The Relation of Choice to Freedom" respecting the actualising of possibilities. Man can and does constantly and knowingly give reality to circumstances, events, and persons, which, without his intervention, would never have had any existence. The face

of the earth on which he lives, the history of his race, the very character of his individual surroundings, his own character, bear witness to this truth. That he is straitly limited in the exercise of his creative power is undoubted: any finite being must be. That he should *feel* himself to be so is proof that he has not entered upon his full prerogatives; that something prevents him from exercising them. What is this something?

Partly, no doubt, it is that he is at an immature stage of development. He feels in himself latent powers, capacities at present but rudimentary, which nevertheless awaken a feeling of unsatiated desire and but half-understood need. Being, because of his self-conscious intelligence, aware of this process of development to which he is subjected, he is restless and uneasy until it can be fully realised. But this is not the whole explanation needful. We have seen that God creates after an ideal, and that because Fatherhood is essential in the divine nature that ideal is Sonship. If man creates, he, too, must create after an ideal: it is the method of creation. Because he is finite, no ideal of his can ever reach up to the divine, can ever more than

partially reflect it; but unless it does do this, unless it is—so far as it goes—in accordance with the divine, and representative of it, it has no place in the true order of nature: to God it does not exist, it lives only in man's sick fancy and illusion, in the false order which, by wrongly wielding the prerogative of creation belonging to him in virtue of his divine sonship, he has brought into existence to and for himself and centred in himself. This self-centredness is, indeed, the vitiating element in the whole matter. The life of Fatherhood and the life of Sonship, as seen in their divine and ideal perfection under those supreme conditions which we can but faintly apprehend, and yet which, because we are made in the image of God, are not altogether a mystery to us, are not self-centred. The life of the Father is a continual giving, the life of the Son is a continual rendering, not of this or that divine prerogative or attribute, but of the Divine Being itself. Thus both alike include, or perhaps we may venture to say, are expressed by, sacrifice; and since the life of creation is moulded on no lower an ideal than that of the Eternal Son, it, too, should be ex-

pressed by a continual rendering of all to Him from whom proceeds all—it, too, ideally, is sacrifice.

And, as we have seen,[1] sacrifice does, in fact, play a very large part throughout the whole organic world. But, like everything else perceived through the medium of the false order, it is confused in its results, perplexing, regarded apart from revelation, morally incomprehensible. For though it does conduce to more perfect and higher life in species, though it does at the human stage become evidently a means, and the most satisfying means, to self-realisation, yet as we behold its working it bears undeniably hard on individuals, and in the case of man is frequently perverted to hurtful ends. The reason lies in the self-centredness which is the keynote to the existence of the false order. Man's creative power, instead of working with and in subordination to that of God, from whom it is derived, and so conducing to the reproduction of the one ideal in infinite richness and variety, has endeavoured to assert itself independently. The consequence is a multiplicity of ideals with no principle of unity, but conflicting and mutu-

[1] "The Law of Liberty."

ally destructive. Yet because the divine ideal of creation remains, the principle of sacrifice remains also, distorted by the false medium through which it is seen, and yet a perpetual witness that Sons of God, blind and fallen though they may be, yet cannot altogether tear themselves asunder from the divine life which is their birthright.

It was under the conditions as man had modified them that the ideal had to be manifested in order that their startling incongruity might be recognised and the one remedy known and followed. The "body of humiliation," the "perfecting through suffering," the "obedience unto death" have their explanation here. Speaking with all reverence, we may surely say that since the Son who is our archetype took upon Him the external conditions not of perfect, but of imperfect manhood, He submitted to limitations, to restraints upon the full prerogatives and privileges of created Sonship which would otherwise have been utterly uncalled for, just as the rejection of Him by those created in His image would have been inconceivable. Because of man's unnatural state there were certain things which Christ could not do, and at the same time

be the revealer of God and the Restorer of the true order. He could not escape rejection and suffering and death. But one thing, the one thing vital and essential to the restitution of man and the revelation of God, He could always do, because He was not internally, but only externally limited by conditions which He had no part in bringing about, which to Him were essentially false,—and that one thing was the Father's will. "Lo, I come to do Thy will, O God," and despite the pressure of the false conditions, through humiliation, agony, and death *it was done.* The true order was vindicated, the accomplishment of the Father's will, the absolute self-surrender which it implies, were shown to be the one path to freedom and power. And thus sacrifice was revealed in its true meaning—not as synonymous with pain and loss, even though in the false order it so often seems inseparable from them, but in its essence the principle of life, and consequently the soul of the highest and strongest joy. How clearly this was apprehended after the Resurrection and Ascension of the Lord may be seen from the way in which St. Paul represents that

consummation of all things which even inspired thought and language can so faintly conceive or express. He says: "And when all things have been subjected unto Him [Christ], then shall the Son also Himself be subjected to Him that did subject all things unto Him, that God may be all in all."[1] It is evident from the context and from comparison with other passages,[2] that "the Son" is here regarded as bringing to its goal the creation of which He is the Archetype and the Representative, the goal itself being none other than such conscious participation in the Divine Life that actually, individually, universally the whole creation in the spirit and power of the Eternal Son may behold and yield itself utterly to the Father. "We shall see the Father no longer in the Son, *but as the Son sees Him*, in the day when God shall be all in all."[3]

This, and nothing short of this, is the goal of created life, the culmination of human development, and the realisation of the divine ideal of manhood. This, therefore, and nothing short of

[1] 1 Cor. xv. 28.

[2] Col. i. 16–18 and 19–20. Heb. i. 2; v. 8, 9.

[3] Origen's interpretation of this passage as given in "The Christian Platonists of Alexandria."—Bigg, 170.

this, accomplishes human freedom, is the final stage at which all consciousness of restraint and limitation is abolished in the fulness of life and vision attained. So transcendent an ideal may well surpass all finite thought to conceive and all finite language to express; but not on that account is it rendered unattainable or unreal, or unpractical in its bearings on actual human life and actual human surroundings. We have now to view in its light the volitional element which is their most important characteristic.

By volition, as distinguished from the wider and more comprehensive term will, we mean will which is intelligent, foreseeing, and consciously purposive. It is in the exercise of such will as this that (as we have seen in a former essay),[1] the necessity for choice arises. Choice is an inevitable consequence of a universe including alike possibilities and self-conscious intelligence. It does not preclude the fact that only the actualisation of certain of these possibilities is in accordance with the divine ideal of creation, and consequently conducive to freedom of development. The ideal of creation is not only (if we

[1] "Relation of Choice to Freedom."

may so speak) subjectively present to the Creator. He wills its actualisation; and, inadequate as are all human analogues to portray the divine, still the nearest approach to what we under this aspect conceive the divine will to be, is that intelligent, consciously purposive volition which has reached so remarkable a development in man. The *intention* of the Creator is the Sonship of the creature.

We have seen that man has creative power, and, moreover, that he creates as God creates, after an ideal. We have seen further that owing to his disordered condition his ideals are not in accordance with the divine, and so are mutually contradictory and destructive. Yet he *intends* that they shall become actual; he directs all his energies to that end; his volition, therefore, is opposed to the divine volition. His ideal is not Sonship, nor his will the Father's will. We do not need any other explanation than this of the bondage in which man finds himself alike materially, mentally, and spiritually. For he cannot really create a universe which is not God's, nor bring into existence *save to and for himself* a self-centred order. To and for himself, however, he can do so, and the source of all the terrible anomalies and

contradictions which confront him so continually, and which he strives to persuade himself are natural, is here, though we can but partially trace it.

Allowance must, of course, always be made for the fact that, besides being disordered, man is also immature, but that does not account for anything but ignorance, and the uncertainty arising from the tentative use of powers yet in the early stage of development. It in no way explains the actual condition of man and of the world as man sees it. That arises from the distortion and falsity due to self-centred ideals and self-centred volition. We may well here make use of the analogy of ordinary childhood. The child has neither the knowledge nor the powers of the grown man. It is impossible that he should enter into his father's councils, or understand, save in a very dim and imperfect way, their meaning when carried into effect. But if the father be a wise and loving father, and the child a trustful and unselfish child, his ignorance and immaturity do not make the home unhappy to him. There is no setting up of separate aims, or clashing of opposed wills. The child, though as yet undeveloped in intellect and character, still so far as

his power goes, makes the father's aims and will his own, and thus materially contributes to their effectiveness so far as he himself is concerned. It is conceivable that man at however immature a stage of development might have so acted towards the divine Father, and he would not then have had to face the perplexities and agonising contrarieties which now burden him so sorely.

The remedy can be but one—a return to the Father's ideal, and a purposive co-operation with His will, so far as is possible at the actual stage of development and under the difficulties to which the establishment of the false order has given rise. How can such a return be made? How is the abnormal development to be arrested and the trammelled life to be set free?

Man was created "in" the Eternal Son, after His likeness, to live and to develop in His power and spirit. If, then, there is to be a restitution of his nature to its original possibilities, if the volition which in a self-conscious being must of necessity gather up into itself all the personal activities, and so be the most complete and comprehensive expression of life, is to be re-directed into its true course, and so become free: that

can only take place through and in the same power and spirit. We see, then, how *orderly* is man's relation to Christ as Redeemer. It is no arbitrary intervention by which he is reinstated; his Restorer is the one who alone can restore, because He is the one in whom are the roots of the existence which needs restoration. Thus St. Paul exclaiming: "Not what I would, that do I practise; but what I hate that I do. . . . Oh, wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" and answering: "I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord,"[1] is not giving thanks for a deliverance wrought against nature, he knows not how, but for the only natural deliverance conceivable, because the only one which sets him upon the path of natural and healthy development.

Just, however, as the co-operation of man's purposive and intelligent will with the divine will is required for the realisation of the ideal of Sonship, so when, owing to disordered conditions, the need for restitution arises the same co-operation is essential. Man cannot be reinstated against his intention. His self-centred ideals and volitions

[1] Rom. vii. 24, 25.

must be foregone, and his purpose, however far short it may yet fall of conscious fulfilment, be expressed in the language of his Archetype and Representative, "Lo, I come to do Thy will, O God." We know how, under the pressure of the false conditions which He came to dispel, amid the gathering darkness and desolation to which He submitted in order to accomplish His purpose, those words were modified on the lips of the Redeemer in the hour of His supreme anguish: "Not My will, but Thine be done."[1] It is the typical expression of the Sons of God awake to the reality of their Sonship, but not yet entered upon its full prerogatives, and surrounded by the bewilderment of the false order. They cannot penetrate the meaning of the Father's will, but they are confident of its wisdom, its righteousness, and love, and therefore they take it for their own. They acquiesce in the absolute self-surrender which is the only road to liberty, and yet which seems at first to be the straitest bondage. The foregoing of self, which is life, takes in the false order the shape of death, and therefore we must

[1] Luke xxii. 43. Comp. Matt. xxvi. 39, 42; Mark xiv. 36; Heb. ii. 10; v. 7–9.

die to live. But the words just quoted, which were the prelude to the shame and agony of the Cross, were the prelude also to the Resurrection and Ascension. To will as the Father wills—*i.e.* to intend with all the power of intelligence and moral effort of which we are capable as the Father intends — is to open the way for the removal of all barriers, the abolition of all restrictions and limitations. It is the first and the most essential step towards being "filled with all the fulness of God."

If, then, the Christian ideal of liberty be the true ideal, and the Christian hope of its attainment well founded, it is impossible to set a limit to the freedom of life and of will which man may ultimately reach. There lies before him not the freedom of a life partially restricted in its power of self-realisation (as is all life that we see now), nor of a volition which can intend, yet is helpless to accomplish, but the freedom of a life utterly untrammelled and of a volition with which intention and accomplishment are inseparable, for the Christian ideal of liberty is in the measure to which a finite being can attain—participation in the liberty of God.

THE LIMITS OF NATURE

"One morning . . . a great cloud came over me, a temptation beset me. . . . It was said 'All things come by Nature.' . . . And as I sat still under it and let it alone, a living hope and a true voice arose in me, which said, 'There is a living God who made all things.' Immediately the cloud and temptation vanished away, and life rose over it all; my heart was glad and I praised the living God."—GEORGE FOX'S JOURNAL, i. 93.

PERHAPS not a few persons may perceive in this remarkable delineation of a deep spiritual experience, the picture of one wider, but no less deep, characterising not an individual merely but an age. Over the century now so soon coming to an end, in the flush of its hopes and discoveries, of its scientific triumphs, of its vast accessions of natural knowledge, and of its hard heaven of stereotyped beliefs—"A great cloud came and a temptation beset it. It was said: All things come by Nature;" and as in the case of George Fox so in this the inference was drawn: all things do not come from God. The result was a darkness that might be felt.

In one point, however, the parallel thus drawn does not hold. It cannot be said of the nineteenth century that it has "sat still" under its spiritual pain, and "let it alone." On the contrary, fretful protests, cries of terror and anguish have arisen on all sides. Perhaps if the strong patience by which the individual saint overcame had been exercised by the age, the "cloud and temptation" would long ago have "vanished away." "*Be still* and know that I am God" is a far-reaching precept, whose application to their own circumstances modern Christians often fail to see. Even as it is, however, there are signs that the cloud is lifting, not "immediately," indeed, but surely, and it may not be without profit if we notice from what direction our deliverance is approaching, what manner of experience it is that is setting our hearts free to praise "the living God."

It is not one that teaches us to go back from the words of our "temptation." We are not learning that all things do *not* come from Nature. On the contrary, the acknowledged realm of the natural is continually becoming more extended. The development of life and mind have long

been included within it, and though we are as yet so wholly ignorant of the manner of their advent, few, if any among us, doubt that it was "by Nature." Where we differ is in the significance we attach to this word *Nature;* and at the outset of our subject it will be well to clear up our minds in this respect. There can be little chance of even so much agreement as is implied in the agreement to differ if we do not know what we are differing about.

Some regard Nature as "the totality of that which is," an interpretation which does violence to etymology—that which is born must be born of something. The tendency of modern scientific thought is to oscillate between this extreme and another—viz. the identification of Nature with the order of human experience, than which there can be no surer road to narrowness and dogmatism. In common parlance Nature most generally denotes the external physical universe, organic and inorganic; and here we have perhaps the true explanation of that dread and horror with which men's hearts have been overwhelmed at the idea that "all things come by Nature." Nature, it was sup-

posed, meant the "material"; and in *human* nature there has ever been an instinctive repugnance to identifying itself wholly with what is understood by the material. Yet if Nature is material, and life and mind come by Nature, there is no avoiding this conclusion.

It is easier to become involved in this vicious circle than to escape from it. Yet the way is open, if we are able to rid ourselves of certain insidious and fallacious presuppositions, with one or more of which we nearly all unconsciously hamper ourselves in our thoughts about Nature.

The first is that, in saying all things come by Nature, we have explained anything regarding their advent. In reality, we have done no more than indicate in what direction explanation is to be sought—through Nature.

The second is that there is any truth in the special identification of Nature with the physical universe. Mind is no less natural than body.

The third is that what is *superhuman—i.e.* transcends either human experience or human understanding, or both—is therefore *supernatural.*

Without attempting at present any formal definition of Nature, we may, if we decide upon

the rejection of these three presuppositions, agree to regard it as (1) non-ultimate, consequently *not* the totality of that which is; (2) as including the whole actual and possible order of human experience, yet not confined to it.

It will be immediately clear that (1) leaves room for the "living God," in what capacity we shall presently consider, and (2) includes within the "natural" all that we designate as spiritual experience—all experience, that is, which implies the exercise of faculties not wholly to be classed as either physical, or mental. From this point of view we should regard as natural any experience, however special and unique, which leads to the knowledge of God, even such as characterises the Christian revelation. Readers of Butler will remember the passage in the "Analogy" in which he says that "there is no absurdity in supposing that there may be many beings in the universe whose capacities and knowledge and views may be so extensive as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them appear natural—*i.e.* analogous or conformable, to God's dealings with other parts of His creation; as natural as the visible known course

of things appears to us."[1] It may seem bold to contemplate the possibility that men, under actual earthly conditions, should perceive it to be so. Nevertheless, this is the direction in which the highest religious thought of the day is tending, and indeed, there is far less novelty in it than many of us are inclined to suppose. What there is, lies in the fact that we are beginning to recognise its logical necessity, but the intuitive Christian reason accepted it long ago. Christ was looked upon, in the early days of the Church, as the apostolic and patristic writings abundantly testify, as the fulfilment and consummation of Creation, of Nature therefore. He could not be this unless He were Himself natural.[2] The beginning of the "great cloud," which has since overwhelmed so many hearts and minds, arose when, from one cause and another, Christ, and because Christ, God, was separated from Nature, and the latter was looked upon first

[1] "Analogy," Part I. ch. i.

[2] A leading modern theologian expresses the same truth thus: "Christ is the crown of Nature: He is thus profoundly natural, and to interpret the Christ we postulate only those spiritual realities which (as every Theist must admit) do in part find expression and in part lie hid behind the veil of Nature." —Canon Gore's "Bampton Lectures," p. 34.

as synonymous with the external universe, separate from its Divine author, in the same sense as a building is separate from its architect, or a statue from its sculptor, and then, by an easy transition, as a self-existing entity and an originating cause. We could not be overwhelmed at the conclusion that all things come by Nature, if we saw in Nature the order which the "living God" everywhere informs instead of a bare abstraction, an impersonal and irresponsible agency, which we are nevertheless compelled to endow with a quasi-personality in order that we may express ourselves intelligibly about it. But to see that Nature is, in very truth and universally, this inspired order of the living God, including all without exception, save Him who brings it forth, is just that conclusion before which "the cloud and temptation" of the age will vanish away, though many as yet fail to perceive it.

Two causes contribute to our blindness; one is our presumption of knowledge respecting that of which we are indeed still so ignorant, the order of Nature; the other is our identification (already referred to) of the material with the natural, and the spiritual with the supernatural.

We have justified this unchristian division to ourselves by much misinterpretation of various passages in the New Testament, notably certain in St. Paul's epistles. The antithesis which he raises, however, is never between the *material* and the spiritual, but between the *carnal* and the spiritual. Thus in the celebrated fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, the spiritual body is not thus named because it is non-material, but because it is the perfect expression of a perfected spirit. He does not seem to contemplate the possibility of the material and the spiritual, the expression and that which is expressed, ever being divorced either in this stage of existence or another, but merely that both shall undergo immeasurable development. The whole context bears out the truth of this interpretation.

Perhaps part of our difficulty in this respect has arisen from our regarding "matter" as synonymous with the visible and the tangible. The true way of looking at it is not thus, however. Under our actual conditions, those alone of which physical science can take any cognisance, certain effects are produced upon us from which we infer the existence of something which we call matter;

but the close study of these effects leads us altogether away from regarding the visible and tangible as their originating cause. All that modern physical science requires as the basis of the universe as we know it, what from this standpoint it fundamentally is, is motion in an invisible, intangible, imponderable medium. If, then, those conditions and effects which we designate as material, including our own bodies, are merely the result of motion in such a medium, no expression which we can imagine for the spiritual opens out, despite (or rather, perhaps, because) of its simplicity, wider possibilities of modification and development than this. The absolute control of motion, if the laws of motion in all their intricate applications were fully understood, and if the power of using them were attained, does not seem a dream of impossible absurdity. But if our bodies *are* motion, such absolute control would give us perfect bodies.

It is not, of course, intended to assert that physical science teaches that there actually is such a condition of things as that above indicated, but it certainly shows that such a condition is possible, for it would be merely an extension and amplification of present experience.

We do already see man working transformations and performing analyses by the aid of physics and chemistry which would have been quite incredible to former generations, and unquestionably relegated to the realm of the supernatural. Yet all that he discovers, and all that he accomplishes, he discovers and accomplishes solely by his increased understanding and control of motion. The sorting out of vibrations (spectrum analysis which has been the means of throwing open whole new regions of scientific research is nothing but this), the re-combining of them into systems which bear, as a whole, no resemblance to any of their constituents, and yet in which none of those constituents is lost or even changed —this is the science of chemistry. The study of the various actions and reactions, internal and external, of those larger, but not more complicated, systems of motion which the physicist designates as "bodies," this is the science of physics. We are never done with marvelling at the wonderful progress it has made, and yet even now how blundering are man's efforts, how partial his successes! How little he understands of that which it concerns him most to know, the capa-

bilities of that particular combination of motions which is his own body. He deals, as he supposes, with the visible and the tangible,—in reality he is dealing with what eludes altogether the perception of the senses.

To realise this,—and, yet it is a commonplace of modern science,—gives a shock to the old notions of the material, and paves the way, perhaps, for the recognition that adequately appreciated and adequately used it is, or may become, an altogether sufficient and appropriate expression for the spiritual. What is needed is that the latter should be complete master of its expression, so modifying, exalting, controlling it, as to meet every demand of spiritual beings; and man under actual conditions falls far short indeed of any such mastery. It is not for science to say whether he will or will not attain to it; but it lies well within the province of science to assert what Christians who have any intelligent apprehension of their own faith should be the last to deny, that if he does attain to it, that attainment will have come about by wholly natural means working towards a wholly natural end. Means and end will be natural from a scientific point of

view, because an intelligible and orderly though transcendent development of actually existing conditions. They will be natural from a Christian point of view because to the Christian the natural and the spiritual are synonymous terms, the whole order of Nature being a spiritual order, and capable, in consequence, of illimitable development.

On such a view, we can set no bounds to Nature save in one direction. If we abandon the old division into "natural" and "supernatural," because we perceive that there can be nothing above Nature, save Him who is also in Nature—the living God—then plainly Nature is limited by God alone. And if through other studies than those of the physical sciences, and other experience than that which lies within the physical region, there has dawned upon us some faint apprehension of the character of the Father of spirits, then we shall begin to see in what direction the limitation lies, for we shall understand that certain of the conditions in which we find ourselves are not in the true sense of the word *natural*, but *unnatural*.

Speaking broadly, we may say that what most impresses us as unnatural is (1) Moral evil;

(2) The relation of organic beings to one another; and (3) Man's relation to the inorganic universe.

(1) To assert that moral evil is unnatural is to place ourselves in opposition to an influential school of modern thought. One who was justly regarded as a leader among scientific men, and who has not long been taken from us, expressed the opinion of the majority when he said, that since the immoral as well as the moral sentiments have been evolved, there is, from the evolutionist's point of view, "as much natural sanction for the one as for the other."[1] The recognised use of language, which, rightly apprehended, contains so many signposts to warn us off the road to error, gives the lie to this assertion. The familiar terms "outraged nature," "against nature"; the common use of the word "unnatural" to denote flagrant offences against the sacredness of social relationships, as when we speak of an "unnatural" son, an "unnatural" father, or the "unnatural" strife of kindred; the frequent use of the same expression in referring to peculiarly horrible vices and their consequences; these with similar and equally widespread habits of language, show that

[1] Huxley, "Evolution and Ethics," p. 31.

we do not really regard Nature as accountable for all the terrible vagaries of vice, disease, and misery, brought about by human error and human self-will. But these extreme instances are only the baneful maturity of propensities which we everywhere see in the germ. If the one is unnatural, as the very words we employ to describe it declare, so is the other.

But there are not wanting considerations pointing towards the same conclusion, which to many minds would appear of greater weight than arguments deduced from the usage of language. The fact, sternly and repeatedly impressed upon us by history and categorically endorsed by science, that a low moral tone is detrimental, and a high moral tone conducive, to the physical and mental progress of both nations and individuals, emphasises the same truth as that to which our ordinary speech bears witness. The effort to rise in the scale of life appears characteristic of man. Retrogression and failure invariably following upon particular courses of conduct, show that Nature bars advance in certain directions. The attempt to persevere in these directions, and yet to advance, is therefore unnatural and foredoomed.

(2) With regard to the relation of organic beings to one another, the preying of life upon life, the unceasing internecine warfare presented to our eyes throughout a world where, as Charles Kingsley said, everything is perpetually eating everything else, offends equally our reason and our moral sense. There are considerations which alleviate, but none which altogether disperses, the dark horror of a universe where the law of sacrifice, in itself adapted to such magnificent possibilities, produces results apparently so cruel and so unjust. Not even the glorious hope, embracing within its scope "the whole creation" with which the Christian Revelation illuminates all sacrifice, completely avails for this. And surely it is better, at any rate for those who regard reason and the moral consciousness as no mere irrelevancies in the scheme of things, but as belonging to the deepest meaning of the universe, not to play fast and loose with them by perverting their healthy instincts. There *is* something in the state of the organic world, as we are alone able to see it, which strikes us as unnatural if we are to regard our noblest intuitions as most supremely natural because "likest God."

Not indeed that we by any means always regard death, or suffering, or sacrifice as unnatural, either in ourselves or in the lower animals. Quite the reverse. But there are circumstances, especially when the human stage is reached, under which we seem compelled to do so. The death of an aged person, tranquil and painless as this so commonly is, and following upon a period of failing powers and decaying faculties, does not seem otherwise than natural, especially to those who, even under the forbidding aspect which it actually presents, look on death as a fitting transition for spiritual beings from one state of existence to another. But the death of a child, of a youth cut off in his promise, or of a man in the prime of his strength and usefulness, affects us far differently. Even holding the faith that

> "Transplanted human worth
> Will bloom to profit otherwhere,"

we cannot disguise from ourselves that it has not bloomed to the profit of which it was capable *here*, nor withstand the conviction that, if all were according to Nature, untimely deaths and unfruitful lives would have no place in the cosmos. The same remark applies to the suffering entailed

on the innocent by the guilty, and the sacrifice of high intellectual and moral qualities to what is lower than themselves. Regarding Nature as the divine order, regarding that unquenchable desire commencing as man emerges from the savage state, and growing more imperious with every upward step in his history, that reason and righteousness shall be found at the heart of things, as a natural instinct, we cannot but perceive that in such anomalies there is something opposed to Nature.

(3) In considering man's relation to the inorganic universe, it will at once strike us that the word "unnatural" never rises to our lips in describing any great physical convulsion. On the contrary, we habitually qualify such events as natural, and that more especially since science has enabled us to see that the most startling and unforeseen physical catastrophes take place no less according to law, than the familiar and never interrupted sequences which first impressed upon the mind of man the fact that the universe is a cosmos. When, however, we observe these catastrophes in their effect on human beings, we feel that there is a very false and jarring note.

A tempest is natural, but in the devastation that it causes of human lives and human hopes and happiness, the unnatural element makes its appearance, and is hardly mitigated, certainly not annihilated, by the reflection, however scientifically true, that such catastrophes, though they bear hardly on individuals, or even on isolated aggregations of men, are on the whole beneficial to living beings in general, man, of course, included. We may fully recognise this, and yet be as fully conscious that it does not even touch the problem why the method of the living God should wear so cruel a semblance. Man who can "look behind and before," who can strive and agonise, and to some extent *understand*, is not holding his true position when he is treated by the mighty but unconscious forces of the physical universe as their sport. We feel with Pascal that he is greater than they are, and that they should be in submission to him, not he to them. Thus both in the physical and the moral regions we trace the presence of an unnatural element in Nature, and from our present point of view the great world-problem may be stated to consist in the separation of the two.

It is a hard task, and one moreover whose difficulty is greatly—almost incalculably—increased by the fact that we mostly work at it without any intelligent consciousness of what we are doing. We insist upon regarding the most flagrant outrages upon Nature as natural, and are then disheartened and disappointed because Nature presents us with so many anomalies and such soul-sickening, reason-defying problems. Might we not hope for better results if we were to acknowledge that not all we find in Nature is in accordance with Nature, and to direct our energies towards ascertaining where the disturbing element comes in? We know that an old answer to this question placed the seat of disturbance in the action of self-will, that travesty of freedom too often mistaken for its reality. We have in the previous essays given some consideration to this answer; and here it must suffice to point out that there is ample food for reflection in the thought that man, by virtue of his self-conscious intelligent will, possesses to some extent creative power. He can—this we see every day—make actual what was before his intervention only possible. To an agent wielding this mysterious power of

creation *wrongly*—*i.e.* not in accord with the divine, and therefore natural, constitution of things, a consideration which more than any other should open our eyes to the awful responsibilities of parenthood,—hopeless anomalies and contradictions must arise on every side. Their seat is in himself, yet they appear to exist independently of him. Such a delineation of man's experience seems to commend itself as mainly true to facts. Moreover, it affords some deeper insight into the meaning of the universal and unchangeable operation of natural law. It has become a matter of common knowledge that offences against Nature are punished by Nature, not capriciously, but according to their kind, and we speak of such punishment as the "natural" consequence of the offence. We do so rightly, but what we too often forget is that the conditions giving rise to this necessity for punishment are *not* natural, in proof of which we have to change them as the sole means of combating the disorder to which they have given rise. Thus, in certain limited connections, we perceive that the root of the trouble lies in ourselves, but the principle may admit of wider application than we are able to give it, save

by recognising, as we are increasingly learning to do, that Nature is ever ready to assist a return to natural conditions whatever may be the emergency which a departure from them has caused.

As a matter of fact, the departures are such that emergencies occur; and it is in the meeting of certain among them that the element which used to be called "miraculous" appears. We need not call it or think of it as such now. Where it really exists, and is not only supposed to do so because we were or are ignorant of some facts which would place it in line with ordinary events, it is neither more nor less than the response of Nature to some peculiar call upon its resources. In other words, it is the divine method justifying itself by its readiness and power to deal with all contingencies.

A miracle, however, is supposed to be a unique occurrence rendered necessary by unique conditions; and Nature, we are told, knows nothing of such occurrences or conditions. Constant repetition and recurrence, constant and orderly modification, sequences which can be traced, results which can be calculated and predicted, this, and this only, we are assured, is what we find in

Nature. It is doubtful whether, even if we strictly confine that term to the physical universe, we could show these assertions to be more than approximately true—true for practical purposes, for the conduct of daily life, for that classification and co-ordination of facts which we call science; but accurately and exactly true, true in such a sense that we may venture to base cosmic theories upon them,—No. What evidence we have points rather to the conclusion that nothing in which a cycle of changes has once set in ever returns precisely to its original state. In other words, it is very doubtful if in the whole history of the physical universe exactly the same conditions have ever twice been reproduced. But, if they have not, there is an element of uniqueness in even the most common physical events—in the rising and setting of the sun, in the alternation of the seasons, in every birth and in every death—which requires a unique adaptation to meet it.

Leaving the inorganic universe on one side, however, and passing over all organic existence below the human, we must, unless we place men and women outside Nature, acknowledge that unique occurrences are both natural and frequent.

Probably few human lives are exempt from them; for there can hardly be a man or a woman who has attained to mature age but can look back upon some one experience which to him or her individually stands and will always stand alone, which, in its significance, its far-reaching results, its influence whether for good or ill upon life, character, and work is unapproached and unapproachable. Nor should the undeniable fact that personality is an indispensable condition of such unique experiences in the least detract from their weight and significance as natural occurrences. Indeed, it cannot do so unless we are prepared to deny that personality is natural, and this is hardly a proposition which can be seriously put forward in the present day.

To admit, however, that there occur in personal existence unique experiences—*i.e.* unique combinations of conditions requiring unique adaptations to meet them—carries us perhaps rather further than is at first apparent. One chief characteristic of personality is that, while a peculiarly individual, it is also a common possession. It is incommunicable and yet it is shared; and that which in each one of us constitutes personality,


we recognise as also constituting it in our fellow-men. This being the case, it can hardly be otherwise than that the counterpart of individual experience should present itself in the race, that in the latter also a unique adaptation to meet unique conditions arising out of the needs, requirements, and capabilities of personal beings should not be unknown. One thing is certain; assertions that such unique adaptations transcending ordinary experience have taken place, cannot be refused credence on the ground that they are unique. We might with equal justice deny the truth of any one of those supreme and revolutionising experiences to which individual human beings are subject, but which do not happen twice in the same lifetime.

It may be said, however, that occurrences to which the term "miracle" is applied, are not mere "subjective" experiences like those to which we have referred as taking place in individual lives, that they have always an "objective" aspect as well, and that this usually consists in some previously unknown modification of the laws of the physical universe. Two considerations suggest themselves in reply to this difficulty. The first

is that if new, though imperceptible, adaptations to meet new combinations of conditions are (as we have reason to believe), constantly occurring in the physical universe, it would be most unreasonable to assert that because occasionally such new adaptations become perceptible to man, therefore they are incredible. The second is that if personal being, as has been assumed throughout this essay, be not an excrescence upon, but the fundamental expression of, the cosmos, then the latter must be moulded upon the requirements of personal being. In that case only immature development and disordered relations between man and the physical universe so mask this truth from him, as to lead him to suppose that physical laws are unable within their province to respond to any call which personal being makes upon them.

Particular applications of these principles do not fall within the scope of the present essay. It must suffice if the writer has succeeded in making clear what she has attempted to advance —viz. that the old misleading division of the cosmos into natural and supernatural, should give way to one more rational and more comprehensive,

the *natural* and the *unnatural.* To Nature as it has been here defined, the universal order of the living God, there are no limits save those which His own Being imposes. The endeavour to set aside these limits by personal agents, wielding as they do a measure of creative power, results in the appearance to them of unnatural conditions, through which nevertheless the divine method works on victorious, sufficient in its infinite comprehensiveness for every demand which can be made upon it, and needing, even in its most supreme manifestations, no supplement to its own resource.



TRANSCENDENTALISM AND MATERIALISM

THE CHRISTIAN *MODUS VIVENDI*

In one of the essays composing his volume, "Right and Wrong," Mr. Lilly observes; "No sort of compromise, no kind of *modus vivendi*, seems to me to be possible between the two schools of transcendentalism and materialism." This is a very sweeping assertion, and it could only be made good if one, at any rate, of these two schools were wholly in the wrong, whereas every impartial student would be willing to allow that each emphasises a truth of the utmost importance. To find a *modus vivendi* between them, therefore, we have but to discover a system which shall include the truth and exclude the error of each. It is proposed to show that a Christian philosophy supplies the possibility of such a system. In making this claim, no pretension is set up

to solve all the problems presented to the mind of man by the actual conditions of his existence, for though a philosophy combining the two systems of thought which in these days chiefly represent the "eternal opposition" between mind and matter, would carry us far more deeply into the "principles of human knowledge" than we have yet been able to penetrate, yet the whole truth must still lie beyond our reach. It has been well said that "the function of x in any finite knowledge is a subject to be pondered, and also the question whether any progress of philosophical speculation can ever eliminate x from a knowledge which is finite."[1] The answer to this question would certainly appear to be in the negative. At the same time it is a matter of undoubted importance that we should put x where it ought to be, and not allow it to usurp the place of a known or knowable quantity, and in this the progress of philosophy should undoubtedly prove of service. The first desideratum is an adequate recognition of facts, and in this transcendentalism and materialism equally fail. Transcendentalism fails because, while emphasising to

[1] Fraser, "Selections from Berkeley," p. 45, *note*.

the utmost "the doctrine that the ultimate explanation of the world is to be found in a rational principle kindred to the *soul* of man," it ignores, or regards as a superfluity, the fact, that throughout the universe as man knows it, that rational principle takes upon itself an expression kindred to the *body* of man. Materialism fails because it magnifies the expression at the expense of what is expressed, and declares, in fact, that beyond the expression, beyond that which is kindred to the body of man, there is for him nothing. It will be necessary somewhat to enlarge upon the epitome thus given of the respective tenets of the transcendentalist and materialist schools.

To begin with materialism. Considered as a system of philosophy, it is supposed to involve a belief in the objective existence of matter, and Professor Huxley, in his little treatise on Hume,[1] animadverts very severely upon the application of the term materialist to thinkers, who, like himself, avow that "the more completely the materialistic position is admitted, the easier it is to show that the idealistic position is unassailable, provided the

[1] P. 82 ("English Men of Letters" Series).

idealist confines himself within the limits of positive knowledge." We all know what results from applying an "idealistic" interpretation to the "materialistic position." It is the philosophy of sense-impressions, of which Professor Karl Pearson has given us so instructive an example in his "Grammar of Science." Now, if we are not allowed to go beyond our senses in laying the foundations of a system of philosophy, that fact appears to the present writer to stamp the system as materialistic. It is not the objective existence of matter which is essential to the "materialistic position," but the double assumption that, as Kant in one place says, though elsewhere he contradicts himself, "all our knowledge begins with sense,"[1] and that the world with which we become acquainted by means of our senses is the only world which exists for us. In this pre-eminence accorded to the sensory lie alike the strength and

[1] "All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence to understanding, and ends with reason."—"Criticism of Pure Reason," Meiklejohn's translation, p. 212. This is not compatible with what Kant tells us at the commencement of his great treatise, that "all knowledge begins with *experience*." No human experience is ever purely sensuous, *i.e.* consisting of bare sense-impressions. The "understanding" plays its part from the very beginning.

the weakness of materialism; the strength, because nature, regarded from this point of view, lends itself so easily to expression in scientific formulæ of ever-increasing comprehensiveness, thus gratifying the craving for simplification which is innate in the human mind; the weakness, because in order to attain that simplification half the conditions of the problem have to be left unstated. Man himself appears as an unaccountable excrescence on an order where no place for intelligence and will is found, and where all the objects of his deepest energies appear as "illusions of his fancy attached to accidental clouds of dust which the eternal cosmic weather may dissipate as carelessly as it has formed them."[1] Well, indeed, has it been said that "a philosophy which is so incommensurate with our most intimate powers as to deny them all relevancy in universal affairs, as to annihilate their motives at one fell blow, will be even more unpopular than pessimism. Better face the enemy than the eternal void!"[2] and the eternal void is what materialism presents to all the highest aspirations and deepest longings of our nature.

[1] James, "Principles of Psychology," vol. ii. p. 667.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 313.

Transcendentalism cannot be accused of doing this. It falls into exactly the opposite error to materialism. Instead of making too much of the sensory, it makes too little. The truth to which, despite all its shortcomings, materialism bears witness,—the worth and dignity of the physical side of nature and of man,—is by transcendentalism either ignored or accorded a grudging and wholly insufficient recognition. It is impossible, for instance, to read the works of the late Professor T. H. Green (however much they may command our respect and admiration, and, to a certain extent, agreement) without feeling that the unfortunate "animal organism" which, for the time being, "is made the vehicle of a partial reproduction of the eternal consciousness" is terribly in the way. If it could be got rid of, the argument would be bolder, clearer, more convincing, more coherent. But it cannot be got rid of, and so it is admitted on sufferance, and very severely admonished to keep its place. It *is* regarded as a mere instrument, as quite independent of the eternal consciousness to whose "reproduction of itself under limitations" it temporarily "organic," and whose choice of suc

a mode of partial manifestation is an incomprehensible mystery.[1] It should in justice be pointed out, however, that the, in some respects, radically different standpoint of another great representative of the English transcendentalist school,—the present Master of Balliol, Professor Caird,—enables him to take a different and far more adequate estimate of the connection between the self-conscious principle and nature. Thus, in his "Critical Philosophy of Kant," p. 483, he says:—"If consciousness in general, to use the language of Kant, is the presupposition of everything, yet the first is also the last, and the self-conscious being, as Psychology regards him, is the highest rational being, the being in whom nature transcends itself, and we cannot isolate man from nature. The *inorganic and organic world is the pre-supposition of the life of spiritual beings*, and that life cannot be made completely intelligible except in relation to the necessary condition of its development."

Compare this passage with the following from Green:—"When we speak of a development of higher from lower forms of intelligence . . . we mean the development of an intelligence which

[1] See "Prolegomena to Ethics," § 82.

in the lowest form from which the higher can properly be said to be developed is already a consciousness of change, and therefore cannot be developed out of any succession of changes in the sensibility, contingent upon the re-actions of the 'psychoplasm' or nervous system, however that system may have been modified by accumulated effects of its re-actions in the past."[1]

This is, of course, true, but it is a one-sided truth. The higher intelligence is not, indeed, developed "*out of*" any succession of changes in the sensibility, but it is developed *by means of* such changes, and Green nowhere makes this clear, apparently does not recognise it. He is strong in insisting that the "analysis of knowledge" cannot be affected by the fact "that countless generations should have passed during which a transmitted organism was progressively modified by reaction on its surroundings, by struggle for existence or otherwise, till its functions became such that an eternal consciousness could realise or reproduce itself through them," but he fails to grasp the truth so plainly stated in the quotation from Caird given above, that the "inorganic and

[1] "Prolegomena to Ethics," § 84.

organic world is the *pre-supposition* [because the means of expression and intercommunication] of the life of spiritual beings." With Green it is a mere annex, and were he the sole representative of transcendentalism the criticism passed on it by Mr. Balfour in his "Foundations of Belief"[1] would be justified; there is no room in it for the contingent; there is no room in it for the given; experience itself would seem to be a superfluity.

Now it is not too much to say that if a philosophy solely based on the sensory can never be universally accepted, because it leaves man without any response to his deepest energies, a philosophy which is contemptuous of the sensory, and so of the field of activity in which those deepest energies must find expression, can never be universally accepted either. Our senses have too strong a hold upon us, our "animal organism" is felt to be too intimately a part of our very self, for any theory of man or of the universe which treats senses and animal organisms as superfluous to be generally regarded as either true or adequate. And how should it be otherwise when not only is every "state of consciousness" attended by bodily

[1] Part II. ch. ii. p. 143.

feelings, but when it is actually by means of the body that we are first enabled to attain to that recognition of a self which, though including the body, is yet not the body?[1] Transcendentalism, if it is to be more than an interesting reflection of some of the deepest speculations of the age, must find room for these facts, and must give them their due place and importance among the foundation-stones of its edifice.

Now it is hardly necessary to point out that a *practical* reconciliation between the apparently opposing truths respectively emphasised in transcendentalism and materialism, has been attained in Christianity by treating both "soul" and

[1] "As soon as definite perception begins, the body as an extended thing is distinguished from other bodies, and such organic sensations as are localised at all are localised within it. At the same time the actions of other bodies upon it are accompanied by pleasures and pains, while their action upon each other is not. The body, also, is the only thing directly set in motion by the re-actions of these feelings, the purpose of such movement being to bring near to it the things for which there is appetite, and to remove from it those towards which there is aversion. It is thus not merely the type of occupied space and the centre from which all positions are reckoned, but it affords us an unfailing and ever-present intuition of the actually felt and living self, to which all other things are external, more or less distant, and at times absent altogether. The body first of all then gives to self a certain individuality, permanence, and inwardness."—*Encyclopædia Britannica*, Edit. IX,, Vol. XX., Art. "Psychology," by James Ward.

"body" as essential to the whole and perfect man, allowing neither to be magnified at the expense of the other. We have but to recall such expressions as "the redemption of the body,"[1] "the Saviour of the body,"[2] "that Christ be magnified in my body,"[3] "Know ye not that your bodies are members of Christ?"[4] and with regard to physical needs: "Your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things,"[5] to perceive how fully the place of the body is recognised in what is nevertheless represented as pre-eminently a spiritual order. That a man should sin against his own body is regarded by St. Paul as one of the most heinous of offences, and that because of the sanctity of the body itself.[6] The surrender of the bodily powers to the service of God is inculcated as of no less importance than the surrender of the spiritual powers: "Present your bodies a living sacrifice."[7] "Glorify God therefore in your body."[8] Moreover emancipation from the body does not form, according to New Testament teaching, part of the blessedness of the life beyond

[1] Rom. viii. 23. [2] Eph. v. 23. [3] Phil. i. 20.
[4] 1 Cor. vi. 15. [5] Luke xii. 30. [6] 1 Cor. vi. 18-20.
[7] Rom. xii. 1. [8] 1 Cor. vi. 20.

the grave. On the contrary, we are said to be now "groaning within ourselves waiting for the adoption," which is not deliverance from, but the redemption of our body."[1] And again: "We that are in this bodily frame do groan being burdened, *not for that we would be unclothed but clothed upon*, that what is mortal may be swallowed up of life."[2]

Such, briefly indicated, is the honour paid by Christianity to the "body" and through the body to all with which the body is akin. Yet, as we well know and as history abundantly testifies, there have been corruptions and travesties of Christianity in which this, one of its most important and remarkable characteristics, has been lost sight of, and the body with all that pertains to it, has been treated as low, vile, debasing, "a brother ass" on whom any amount of indignity and reproach might deservedly be heaped. Nay, Christians of the present day are by no means altogether free from the mistaken view that the needs and requirements of our "material" nature are in themselves lowering and even defiling. The

[1] Rom. viii. 23.

[2] 2 Cor. v. 4. See also preceding verses. The references throughout are to the Revised Version.

undue exaltation of celibacy by certain sections of the Church; the notion which not a few persons entertain that neglect of health, of habits of cleanliness, of a due regard to personal appearance are to some extent necessary consequences of "spiritual-mindedness," a sign of "sitting loosely" to the things of sense; still more the "unreal sentiment which pities us here as 'pent in the body,' as 'gaining eternal life' only by our own dying," are all so many examples of the one-sidedness with which, in utter contradiction to their professed faith, numbers of Christians regard the connection between the "spiritual" and the "material." The fact remains, however, that they are in contradiction to it—that the practical solution of the "transcendentalist" and the "materialist" problem by Christianity is to treat both spirit and body as equally real, equally essential, and each in its rightful place equally important, the spirit being the life-giving principle, and the body the form in which it finds expression.

This, we say, is the "practical solution" offered by Christianity. But it must be observed that very often a practical solution is not really a solution at all, but merely an ignoring of the

problem, a cutting, not an untying of the Gordian knot. It is not always thus, however. There are practical solutions which are indeed solutions, and which consequently imply theoretical solutions. In such cases the "theoretical solution" is the universal or absolute solution, and the "practical solution" is the application of the theoretical in some particular instance. Mathematics affords abundant illustrations in point. The solution of general problems in pure mathematics—*i.e.* the working out of mathematical theory,—renders possible the solution of particular problems in applied mathematics, *i.e.* the practical use of mathematical methods. Yet this is not always apparent to those who make the practical application. Many persons use logarithmic tables who could give but a poor account of the theory of logarithms. Nevertheless if that theory had not been worked out, the particular application of it, which is so useful to them, would have been non-existent. Wide apart as the subject now under consideration lies from mathematics, they have this in common, that a practical solution of the problems of either is a real solution, and consequently is only possible because there exists a

theoretical solution. From the Christian standpoint, we may regard the Christian revelation as the divine solution to human intelligence of the problem of the relationship between spirit and matter. The existence of the solution,—its having been worked out,—renders possible its practical application to the difficulties and perplexities of human life; but this does not necessarily involve theoretic comprehension of it. Just as we may have an excellent working engineer or mechanician who is ignorant of the theory of those mathematical methods which he employs to such good practical purpose, so we may have, and very frequently do have, a faithful and consistent Christian who each day of his life is making practical application of the divine solution to its chief problem, while yet he would be utterly unable to give the theoretic demonstration of that solution. This fact, however, only enhances its value; and even as the growing need of more powerful mathematical methods to deal with physical problems spurs forward the "pure" mathematician in his abstract investigations, so the demands and requirements of Christian practice should encourage the Christian philosopher to prosecute his researches into

that mine of theoretic truth which has as yet been so inadequately explored.

Before proceeding to examine the solution given us of the "eternal" problem it will be as well, perhaps, briefly to re-state the problem itself—not in philosophical language, but as it must present itself to the intelligence of every thinking man—and especially to point out what practical difficulties arise from it; for where the appearance "of x in finite knowledge" involves these, there we may be sure it ought not to be, and thence we have a right to try and eliminate it. The problem then is this:

In the universe, as we know it, we find two sets of phenomena which we denominate, respectively, the physical and the psychical. To ordinary observation, and in ordinary parlance, the physical cover by far the widest range, including the whole of the inorganic division of nature, and claiming the larger share even when we enter the organic. "Of the whole number of physical processes which constitute the course of the material universe, vital phenomena form but a narrow and circumscribed part; and of vital phenomena themselves, there are again but few in which mental processes can

be either perceived or inferred from observation."[1] Moreover wherever psychical phenomena "are perceived or inferred" it is always with certain physical correlatives. We have no experience of the one apart from the other, and therefore, from one point of view, it seems a reasonable hypothesis that "what we call the operations of the mind are functions of the brain [*i.e.* are physical], and the materials of consciousness products of cerebral activity."[2] From another point of view, however, this apparently simple explanation presents formidable difficulties. With the advent of psychical phenomena "the old order changeth, yielding place to the new," or rather, the new order arises within the old, and so dominant does it become, so masterful are these "products of cerebral activity," that in their highest manifestation they pit themselves with very tolerable success against the rest of the cosmos and subdue it to their own ends. "The sum of phenomena, which we call an individual mind or soul," rises, because it is associated with consciousness, superior to the whole vast sum of phenomena which make

[1] "Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology."—Wundt. 2nd. edit. p. 443. [2] Huxley, "Essay on Hume," p. 80.

up the physical universe. It thinks, it loves, it aspires, it strives, and even in defeat still retains its superiority inasmuch as it knows it is defeated.[1] Is there matter for surprise that a "sum of phenomena," resulting in such activities as these, should refuse to be classed under so inadequate a category, should assert itself to be more than phenomenal, and instead of being content to figure as a "function" of physical processes, should turn the tables by regarding those very processes as functions of its own, the result of its own activity by which they are altogether determined?

This epitome of the problem once more makes it clear that the x which we have to eliminate, and whose presence gives rise to such mutually exclusive theories, lies in the relation of the psychical to the physical, or, as we are more accustomed to hear it stated, of the spiritual to the material. What is the connection between these? Are they even connected at all, or are

[1] L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers s'arme pour l'écraser. Une vapeur, une goutte d'eau suffit pour le tuer. Mais quand même l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme est encore plus grand que ce qui le tue parcequ'il sait qu'il meurt, et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui l'univers n'en sait rien."—Pascal, "Pensées," chap. ii., 10.

they merely arbitrarily associated? Or are they one, and do they only appear to be two? Transcendentalism and materialism each in its own way accepts the latter alternative, with what unsatisfactory results we have seen. The practical impossibility of ignoring either "spirit" or "matter" is a death-blow to any theory which involves such a necessity. If both are recognised, however, the question of their relationship at once asserts itself as of paramount importance—practical as well as theoretical. If the "material" is a mere superfluous appendage to the spiritual; if the "body" of man is nothing but a drag upon those higher spiritual faculties which it clouds and deadens, then his wisdom and duty are to endeavour as far as possible to free them from their "physical trammels," and to concern himself as little as may be with the demands and necessities of the body. If, on the contrary, the material may be regarded as in any sense the expression of the spiritual, if the "body" is not a mere prison-house and dungeon for the "soul," but the "form" under which the latter appears, then that body has a right to all the care and respect, all the discipline and training, all the

honour and reverence which shall enable it to become a truer, purer, more powerful rendering of the spiritual meaning. This, as we have seen, is the practical teaching of Christianity. We have now to turn to its theoretical justification. In doing so it will be necessary to take for granted the main facts of the Christian revelation. Those who are believers in Christianity are, therefore, asked to bring their faith to bear upon the considerations about to be placed before them. Those who are not believers are asked to regard Christianity as a working hypothesis, and to test its value by its applicability to the problem under consideration.

The central fact of the Christian revelation is the Incarnation, and the truth to which that fact testifies before all others is the Fatherhood of God to man, based, not on an arbitrary connection between the Creator and the creature, but on the divine nature itself, into which Fatherhood and Sonship essentially enter. Because God as God is Father, and God as God is Son, therefore the ideal of creation is sonship, and man is, and is treated as, a son of God. Consequently, *the* Son of God, "the same who was in the begin-

ning with God," fitly took upon Him the form of manhood in and through which to reveal God.

"So akin are God and man to one another that God can really exist under conditions of manhood without ceasing to be, or to reveal God: and man can be taken to be the organ of Godhead without one whit ceasing to be human. Here in Christ Jesus, it is man's will, man's love, man's mind which are the instruments of Godhead, and the fulness of the Godhead which is revealing itself only seems to make these qualities more intensely human."[1]

"These qualities" express themselves, as we know, by physical means. "Man's will, man's love, man's mind" are manifested in, not out of, the body, and this is part of our meaning in calling them human. As "instruments of the Godhead" they were not exempt from this necessity, nor could they have been if they were to remain human, so that the fact that "God can show Himself as man" because He is thus expressing Himself in His own image, compels the

[1] "Bampton Lectures," by the Rev. Canon C. Gore, p. 117.

recognition that the body as well as the spirit of man is "akin" to the Divine.

But that body is akin also to whatever is physical, to the whole material universe therefore, and thus the fact to which the Incarnation bears such invincible witness, that man who is not pure mind is yet the image of God, enables us to understand why the "rational principle kindred to the soul of man" takes upon itself throughout the universe, as man knows it, an expression kindred to the body of man. That expression is in the fullest sense of the words part of the divine order, essential, if we may so say, to the manifestation of the supreme and eternal Spirit to those spirits whom He has brought into existence. Were it not so, had man's spiritual faculties alone received the divine impress, did they alone originate in and tend towards God, what has been called a "subjective religion," a religion based solely upon inward conviction and disregarding outward experience, would have sufficed to his needs. It does not so suffice because the inward and the outward are inseparable, and in order to respond to the requirements of the whole man, the Incarnation witnessing to

the sacredness of the soul and body, of inward and outward alike, is vouchsafed as the truest and most adequate revelation of the Father of our spirits.

Light is thus thrown upon the real meaning of "the inorganic and the organic world being the pre-supposition of the life of spiritual beings." They are so because the life of spiritual beings, as exemplified to us in what is made known of the Supreme Life itself, does not consist in movements of pure thought, but in an activity which needs and which finds expression. Therefore the possibility of such expression must necessarily be a *sine quâ non* of spiritual existence. Beings who partake in such an existence require a medium of communication. So far as we know the physical universe is that medium, nor can we restrict its so being to the conditions of earthly life. The Incarnation, and the intimate connection between the spiritual and the physical, which the Incarnation implies, preclude such a view of the matter. They lead us to understand that the "redemption of the body," the "one divine event to which the whole creation moves," "groaning and travailing in pain together until now," is the empowering

of all nature adequately to render the spiritual meaning which, under actual conditions, it is only able to convey by scattered hints and in broken fragments; while to man the "roof and crown" of nature, the redemption of the body, is described as "the fashioning anew of the body of our humiliation that it may be conformed to the body of His [Christ's] glory."[1] That deeper, fuller, more perfect communion of the human with the divine, which is the goal of all religious aspiration, is thus not represented as independent of physical agency. On the contrary, we are led to regard the "natural" body in and through which, despite its weakness, its infirmity, its corruptibility, that mightiest of all aspirations finds utterance, "as the blessed and necessary antecedent" of the "spiritual" body whose existence is treated by St. Paul as the immediate consequence of the existence of its predecessor.[2] No other construction but this can be placed upon the facts of the Christian revelation. The risen body of our Lord was different from the "body

[1] Phil. iii. 2.

[2] "If there is a natural body, there is a spiritual body."—1 Cor. xv. 44, Revised Version.

of His humiliation," but it was still a body. The "body that shall be," the body whose purer, higher activities will respond to each impulse of the purer, higher spiritual life which has called them forth, is not the "body in which we groan being burdened," but it is none the less a body. Disembodied spirits are not recognised in the New Testament. Angels, the "spirits of just men made perfect," the Lord Himself after His ascension appear embodied, using human language and human gesture. We seem then to have here an answer to the objection sometimes made to the "immortality of the soul," that we have no right to infer the continued existence of "a series of mental phenomena" after the "series of physical phenomena" with which it was associated have come to an end. Neither the one nor the other comes to an end. The decay of the "natural" body, and its resolution into its constituent elements, is no proof at all that there is even an interruption in the series of physical phenomena attendant upon a special series of psychical phenomena. If both are associated, as the Christian revelation teaches us, with an indissoluble life, there is no interruption. What we call death is

proof only of a great change, and the immortality which Christians are led to look forward to is not the immortality of the *soul*, but the immortality of the *whole man*, soul and body alike. Thus, as Romanes points out in his "Thoughts about Religion," the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body, though not designed to meet the materialistic objection to individual personal immortality, in fact does so. Experience, so far as it has gone, negatives the possibility of a human mind existing without a human body. The Christian revelation in no way contradicts this experience, but, on the contrary, accepts it with all its consequences, by showing us that over no part of man, either soul or body, has death the power of destruction. The fact that the "spiritual" body, the successor to the "natural" body, is not identical with it, in no way invalidates what has been said. Our "natural" bodies are continually renewed, and in the course of three-score years and ten a man changes his body several times over. The process is gradual, and he is quite unaware of it; but the fact that it takes place should show him that the same "material" particles are not needed to ensure the uninterrupted continuance

of a series of physical phenomena, and its unbroken adjustment to the series of psychical phenomena with which it is linked, and which in union with it render consciousness possible.

The theoretic, the universal solution of the problem of the relationship between spirit and matter, as given to us in the Christian revelation is therefore that both enter into the essential nature of the universe. If God, who "is spirit," revealed Himself not only through a human mind, but through a human body, then both have received the divine impress. In whatever way we define, or do not define, matter, whether or not we regard it as having objective existence, that which we mean by it is a consecrated means of divine communication, and it is but conjecture, to which no fact in our experience,—even extending that experience into the region of the Christian revelation,—lends support, that in communication between spirit and spirit it can ever be dispensed with.[1]

[1] It may be objected that the facts of telepathy disprove this assertion. The writer ventures to think that, on the contrary, they give it weight. Besides the ordinary "gross" matter with which we are familiarly acquainted, there is the ether of whose existence modern physicists are no less certain, and which for

The notion which lies at the bottom of this conjecture is that the order of nature is not a necessary order, *i.e.* that it might have been quite different from what it is, and yet have been equally divine,—and this notion is itself founded on another, viz. that the divine freedom and omnipotence imply the possibility of doing anything anyhow. But this is not freedom, it is chaotic licence, and totally at variance with the inspired conception that certain modes of action *become* (are in harmony with) the divine nature while others do not. Probably no one, certainly no Christian, would arrive after due reflection at the conclusion that any kind of activity might equally be the outcome of the divine nature. There must always be one kind which would be more fully expressive, and more perfectly satisfying than any other. For that very reason this one, and this one only, is truly divine, and conse-

the purpose of such considerations as those set forth in the present Essay, must be included in the general term "matter." Those physical phenomena which were formerly referred to action at a distance, are now regarded as taking place through ethereal agency. It seems an unnecessarily retrograde movement to postulate action at a distance to account for part of a series of psychical phenomena, the other part of which has demonstrably a physical side.

quently possible. God cannot act in contradiction to His own nature, nor otherwise than in perfect accord with it, so that in bringing into existence a universe of spiritual life expressing itself through matter, "He willed as He was. The idea of the election of one from among many possible worlds, is a philosophical myth; the only possible world was the one realised. The divine Will is not contingent or arbitrary because it is free; the free action is spontaneous, an action into which the whole nature as a whole, as it were, involuntarily and harmoniously blossoms. God might or might not have acted; but if He did act, the way He took was the only way possible to Him."[1]

The conclusion to be drawn from this consideration is obviously that, like the Will of its divine Author to which it is due, the connection between the spiritual and the physical, which we everywhere find, is not "arbitrary or contingent," but the spontaneous outcome of the divine nature being what it is. This medium of communication between spirit and spirit, and between Himself and

[1] "The Place of Christ in Modern Theology," Fairbairn, p. 445.

all spirits, is what it "became" God to establish, and therefore it is as indestructible as the spiritual life itself. The development, the progress, the unceasing aspiration of the latter re-act as is inevitable upon the physical expression. We can set no limit to what the physical may become because we can set no limit to what the spiritual may become. In both are divine possibilities.

The purpose of this essay has now been so far fulfilled as to show that if the Christian revelation be true, a *modus vivendi* between the transcendentalism and materialism is found, because all the facts on which they are respectively based are accepted, and the truth emphasised by each school is allowed full scope. A few concluding remarks seem, however, to be called for.

In the first place, the writer once more desires to point out that the validity of the considerations brought forward does not in any degree depend upon the way in which we define "spirit" and "matter," or whether we use these terms at all to express what we mean by the psychical and the physical. We have these two classes of phenomena; they appear to be interdependent, yet

they are absolutely distinct.[1] This admission and one other are all which the argument requires us to premise. The "one other" is that whatever "belongs to the meaning of the world" *continues;* in other words, is essential and eternal. Transcendentalists and materialists, each clinging to their own side of the truth, declare, the former that mind in some connotation, the latter that matter in some connotation, is what belongs to the meaning of the world, and so persists. Science and the Christian revelation teach us, on the contrary, that it is the *union of the two* which belongs to that meaning, and consequently that it is the union of the two which endures.

Further than this it is not possible to go, for here we encounter the x which can never be wholly eliminated from finite knowledge. The indissoluble union between the psychical and the physical is a truth which science daily presses home to us with more convincing certainty. The Christian revelation tells us that the reason of this union lies in the divine nature, and gives an overwhelming proof that the physical is no less

[1] James, in his "Principles of Psychology," calls them functions, in the mathematical sense, of one another.

divine than the psychical. So far as this, then, the problem is solved. We do not need to inquire whether "mind" or whether "matter" is the permanent element in the universe. Both are shown to lie at the foundation of things; but here we are stopped. An advance would mean that we have the temerity to formulate, and the presumption to suppose we can answer, the inquiry why the divine nature is what it is. In the knowledge that it is what it is (and into this knowledge, despite our limitations, we are enabled to some extent to enter), lies for us the solution of the "eternal problem" of mind and matter, because we are shown that both form parts of the essential constitution of the universe. Therefore in the mistaken endeavour to found any ultimate explanation of it on the one exclusively or on the other exclusively, we are separating what God has joined together and are foredoomed to failure.

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